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ABSTRACT
POWER AND MOTIVATED IMPRESSION FORMATION
MAY 1997
STEPHANIE A GOODWIN, B A., UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AUSTIN
M S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Susan T. Fiske
Four studies explore the relationship between power—control over others’
outcomes—and impression formation. Participants in each study occupied different
power roles: the powerful (mangers) controlled others’ outcomes, the powerless
(employees) were contingent on the powerful for outcomes, and the power-irrlevant
(alternate participants) neither controlled the powerless nor were contingent on the
powerful. Dependent measures included attention to target trait information and
impression ratings. Power-irrelevant targets served as the experimental control condition.
Participants were predicted to ignore both stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent information about these targets, forming moderately stereotypic but relatively
less confident impressions. Powerful participants were predicted to stereotype
subordinates by default (ignoring stereotype-inconsistent information) and by design
(effortfully attending to stereotype-consistent information). As a result, powerholders’
impressions of subordinates were predicted to be most stereotypic and most confident.
In
contrast, the powerless were predicted to individuate the powerful, effortfully
attending to
vii
stereotype-inconsistent information and forming less stereotypic impressions, relative to
the other groups. The results of Study 1 support the hypotheses regarding attention to
trait information; attention to trait information varied as a function of perceiver/target
power roles. The impression rating data did not support the hypothesized relationship
between power and stereotyping. Studies 2-4 failed to replicate the attention data of
Study 1 . Intergroup versus intragroup contexts are discussed as a possible explanation for
the failure to replicate across studies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine growing up next to a cement factory, and imagine the cement dust
inevitably becoming a part of your body. As we grow up within a society
that is saturated in white racism. ..we cannot live from day to day without
absorbing a certain amount of [racism and sexism] into our thoughts
(Ezekial, 1995, p. 322).
The “-isms” of the past—racism, sexism—still haunt us today. Although publicly
expressed attitudes toward traditionally oppressed social groups (e g., women, non-White
ethnic and racial groups) have no doubt changed for the better (Dovidio, Brigham,
Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; for historical review see Jones, 1997), prejudice and social
inequality persist. Nearly forty years after the U S. civil rights movement began, women
and non-Whites fare little better economically; equally competent and qualified members
of these groups remain underpaid and underrepresented in positions of social power,
despite changes in public attitudes. Social problems on this grand scale are obviously
multiply determined, but analysis of these phenomena on an individual level can provide
important insight into the mechanisms that maintain the status quo in power relations
among different groups (Fiske, 1993; Jost & Banaji, 1994). Aggregate social inequality
can be explained in part as a cumulative consequence of
powerful individuals making
biased decisions; powerful people are ultimately responsible
for distributing resources
fairly. Understanding how and why powerful individuals make
biased decisions about their
subordinates is therefore important to understanding
the broader issue of social inequality
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Overview and Theoretical Framework
Powerful people
—
people who control others’ outcomes—differ in their exclusive
position as sanctioned social judges. Unlike people in other roles, powerful people are
expected to evaluate other people. Managers, judges, and teachers are all expected to
form opinions and evaluate others in the course of deciding how to distribute outcomes
Employees, criminal defendants, and students are not ascribed a reciprocal privilege to
judge the powerful. 1 One could argue that if powerful people make biased decisions it is
simply because they are just like anyone else making social judgments, people often rely
on stereotypes when they are not especially motivated to be accurate (for reviews, see
Fiske, in press; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Neuberg, 1996). However, the present thesis
argues that powerful people can be especially motivated to be inaccurate , to form biased,
stereotypic impressions of their subordinates; stereotyping fulfills motivational pressures
that accompany powerholders’ positions of control and unique authority to judge. At issue
here, then, is the relationship between power and motivated stereotyping.
Stereotyping has a long empirical tradition in social psychology that is reflected in
a myriad of theoretical approaches (for historical overview, see Fiske, in press; Leyens,
Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994). The level of analysis adopted here is social cognitive,
focusing on intrapersonal cognitive processes (i.e., attention and impression
formation) in
interpersonal contexts. More precisely, this research addresses not only
what powerful
people think about subordinates, but especially how these individuals
think. How does
2
power influence stereotype-based cognitive processes during impression formation9 The
present studies explore: 1) how social power influences cognitive processing strategies
and stereotyping during impression formation, 2) how these cognitive processes influence
judgment, and 3) factors that may moderate the relationship between power and
stereotyping.
The following sections outline the theoretical basis for the hypothesis that power
leads to motivated stereotyping of subordinates with consequences for cognitive
processing and impression formation. The argument begins with a brief definition of social
power and its operationalization in the current research. An overview of impression
formation follows, focusing on current social cognitive models that describe when people
do and do not rely on stereotypes. This literature suggests that powerful people may
stereotype subordinates by default—by effortlessly ignoring information that challenges
group stereotypes. The discussion then turns to theories of social judgment that address
the unique motivations associated with having authority to judge. This analysis indicates
the powerful may be especially motivated to maintain their stereotypes. In consequence,
the powerful may stereotype subordinates by design—by effortfully focusing on
information that confirms stereotypic beliefs. Having outlined the motivations for powerful
people to stereotype, the discussion turns to recent research supporting the hypothesized
relationship between power and stereotyping. Empirical questions that follow from these
studies relate to the present research. The chapter concludes with an overview of
the
general aims and hypotheses of the present research.
1
The powerless, of course, often form opinions of the powerful, but
these evaluations are expected to
3
Social Power, Impression Formation and Stereotyping
Social Power: It Takes Two
When we think about social power, images of political figures (e g . President Bill
Clinton), wealthy corporate executives (e g.. Bill Gates), and intellectual elites (e g.,
Stephen J. Gould) generally spring to mind. But, as theorists long ago recognized, these
images of power are confounded with power’s common correlates (e g., prestige, wealth,
and knowledge), so they are not heuristically valuable for empirical study (Bierstedt,
1950). Instead, the general consensus among social psychologists has been to define
power in terms of social influence: the ability to change another person’s attitudes,
emotions, or behaviors (Cartwright, 1959; French & Raven, 1959). This definition,
however, is also problematic; it assumes that influence attempts must be successful for a
person to have power (Depret & Fiske, 1993). Nevertheless, people may have power and
still be unable to successfully influence the people they have power over. For example,
when Chinese students protested for democracy in Tianemen Square, the government
troops surrounding the square unarguably had more power. Yet, these powerful troops
could do little to influence the students to give up their position. Social influence does not
fully describe the nature of power in social contexts, the internationally-televised image
of
a lone Chinese student standing down a government tank captures this point rather
vividly.
remain private and necessarily lack consequences for the powerful.
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Power as Control
In response to these definition issues, Depret & Fiske (1993) have argued that
power should be defined in terms of its inherent social nature More precisely, power may
be defined by the nature of outcome control and outcome contingencies that are ascribed
to different partners in a social relationship. People who control others’ outcomes are
relatively powerful. In contrast, people whose outcomes are contingent on the powerful
are relatively powerless. Adopting this perspective of power as control, one can see that
many relationships in everyday life are characterized by power. Teachers as well as
managers may control other people’s outcomes (e g., grades or wages), but they may do
so without altering how the powerless think or behave. As managers have long lamented,
for example, signing the paycheck may have little influence on employees’ fundamental
work ethics! This definition of power is unconfounded with regard to common correlates
of power (i.e., status) and does not assume the powerful are necessarily successful at
influencing their subordinates
Treating power as control within the context of a relationship also recognizes
gradations in the asymmetry of power relations. One person’s power is always relative to
that of others in a given relationship (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Depret, 1993). Asymmetry in
outcome control, one person having disproportionate control over another, is what
distinguishes power relations from simple interdependence (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).
The present research is concerned with how powerful people think about their
subordinates as a partial explanation for inequality among different social
groups. It is
theoretically and empirically important to establish first the
relationship between outcome
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control and stereotyping in power relationships that are not confounded by mutual control
(i.e., those in which powerholders are not themselves reciprocally contingent on the
powerless). Hence, for empirical purposes, power is defined here in more restricted terms
as absolute outcome control, powerful participants in these studies have disproportionate
control over but are not contingent on powerless subordinates. With this definition of
power in mind, the next section turns to impression formation and stereotyping
Impression Formation
Since Asch first proposed his theory of trait integration (1946), social
psychologists have proposed numerous theories to explain how people make sense of
social information (for reviews see Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Leyens, 1997). In general,
researchers agree upon three basic stages of impression formation: 1 ) categorization and
stereotype activation, 2) interpretation of available information, and 3) response
(Bodenhausen & Macrae, in press).
When we initially encounter other people, we automatically categorize them on the
basis of their salient social group characteristics—e g., age, gender, race (for a review, see
Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993). Automatic (i.e., unintentional) categorization occurs rapidly,
outside of perceiver consciousness or control (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
Once social categories have been mentally accessed, stereotypes associated with category
membership are also likely to come to mind automatically (Bargh, 1994; Blair & Banaji,
1996, Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). This automatic activation, or priming, of stereotypes
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has important consequences for the next stage of impression formation, the interpretation
of available information. During this stage, people may attend to information available in
the situation (e g., the person’s behaviors, etc.) and try to integrate it with previously
acquired information about that individual or the individual’s social groups (e g., women,
blacks). Importantly, cognitively accessible stereotypes alter how social information is
interpreted, having consequences for both intrapersonal (e g., perception, person memory)
and interpersonal (e g., behavior) phenomena. Current models of impression formation
emphasize perceiver motives as important predictors of whether or not stereotypes
influence interpretation (Brewer, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). People can overcome the
automatic use of stereotypes, but doing so requires considerable motivation and cognitive
effort (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
With regard to these three general impression formation stages, the present
analysis is concerned with the latter two. how powerful people interpret information about
subordinates (i.e., whether or not activated stereotypes are applied), and how these
interpretations subsequently influence judgment. The Continuum Model (CM) of
impression formation is particularly relevant to these questions because it specifically
addresses interpretation and motivations not to stereotype (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
The Continuum Model: To Stereotype or Not to Stereotype
According to the CM, people may engage in a number of different impression
formation strategies that range from effortless to effortful cognitive
processes (Fiske &
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Neuberg, 1990). The amount of effort people expend when thinking about others depends
on two factors: motivation and cognitive ability (i.e., mental resources).
When people are uninterested or unable to attend to others (e g., busy trying to
remember when they last changed the oil in their cars), they engage in effortless
stereotype-based impression strategies, stereotyping by default. Stereotyping others by
default involves relative inattention to stereotype-inconsistent information People who are
unmotivated are likely to notice only information that “fits” their expectations and
stereotypes; information that does not fit simply is ignored. Since people must first attend
to stereotype-inconsistent information if they are to integrate it into impressions, effortless
inattention to non-stereotypic information necessarily leads to more stereotypic,
homogeneous impressions (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990).
In contrast, when people are motivated to form accurate impressions, they may
engage in an effortful form of impression formation
—
individuation—that can overcome
the ill effects of stereotype activation. When people want to form accurate impressions,
information that does not fit stereotype expectations is relatively more useful than
information that fits (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987).
Because stereotype-consistent information is redundant with what is already known ,
accuracy-motivated perceivers find it less informative. Consequently, people with accuracy
motives pay increased attention to stereotype-inconsistent information (Fiske
& Neuberg,
1990). When people notice information that challenges their stereotypes, they have
the
opportunity to integrate it into their existing beliefs and to form
more individuated—i.e.,
less stereotypic—impressions. It is important to note that
individuating impression
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strategies are necessary but not sufficient for reducing stereotypic impressions, people
who attend to stereotype-inconsistent information may refute it
Initial research exploring individuation strategies has identified several factors that
increase accuracy motives and afford non-stereotypic impressions In addition to explicit
accuracy motives (i.e., telling people to be accurate; Neuberg, 1989; Neuberg & Fiske,
1989), people tend to adopt individuating impression strategies when they are accountable
to others (i.e., they expect to justify their impressions to an authority figure, Erber &
Fiske, 1984; Tetlock, 1983), and when their outcomes are mutually contingent on another
person’s performance (Neuberg & Fiske, 1989; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990: Ruscher, Fiske,
Miki & VanManen, 1991). Outcome-dependent people adopt accuracy motives
presumably as a means of prediction and control over their own outcomes Imagine
collaborating on a paper with a colleague and knowing nothing about that person’s writing
skills or inclination to contribute to the project, forming an accurate impression of the
person would likely improve one’s own chances of successfully completing the paper. As
noted, empirical tests bear out the relationship between outcome-contingency and
individuating impression strategies. Participants who believe their own chances for
winning a prize are contingent on another person’s performance, for example, will pay
significantly more attention to information that challenges their stereotypes, compared to
people who are not outcome-dependent.
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Power as Control and Impression Formation
Fiske (1993) has applied the definition of power as control to the literature on
individuation and mutual outcome-contingency (i.e., interdependence), proposing a
tripartite model of power and stereotyping. According to the Power-As-Control (PAC)
model, powerholders may stereotype subordinates by default (ignoring stereotype-
inconsistent information) because 1) they do not need
,
and are therefore are unmotivated
to attend to subordinates, 2) they may be unwilling to attend to subordinates owing to
individual differences in power-relevant personality characteristics (i.e., to the extent that
they have dominant personalities), or 3) they may be unable to attend to subordinates if
cognitive processing demands are high (i.e, if they have many subordinates).
The first issue, whether powerful people are unmotivated, is central to the present
research. By definition, the powerful are relatively non-contingent on the powerless.
Lacking outcome-dependency, there is little need for the powerful to expend cognitive
resources to form accurate impressions of subordinates. Hence, outcome-controlling
powerful people are predicted to ignore information that challenges stereotypes,
stereotyping subordinates by default.
In contrast, powerless perceivers ought to be motivated to form relatively accurate
impressions of their powerholders, as noted. The powerless—similarly to mutually
contingent perceivers—are likely to seek accurate impressions of the powerful as a
means
of prediction and control over their own outcomes. Consequently, powerless
people are
likely to individuate the powerful, paying significant attention to
information that
challenges stereotypes.
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Powerholders’ Motives to Maintain Stereotypes
Stereotyping subordinates by default is but one strategy whereby the powerful may
stereotype subordinates. In addition to this unmotivated bias, the powerful may employ
motivated, effortful strategies that also bias their impressions (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996a)
Whether or not the powerful stereotype effortfiilly, as opposed to effortlessly, is likely a
function of whether they feel able to judge (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996b, Leyens, Yzerbyt, &
Schadron, 1994).
Social Judgeability Theory
Social Judgeability Theory (SJT) addresses when and why people feel able to
judge others (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992). Because the powerful are uniquely
expected to judge, SJT is especially relevant to power and stereotyping. Empirically,
research supports the basic principle of SJT: people refrain from judging others unless
they feel able to do so (Leyens, Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1992; Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, &
Rocher, 1994).
People are more likely to feel able to judge when their judgments meet four basic
criteria (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992; 1994). 1) Judgments must fit the available
information. People do not typically make judgments that vary wildly from available
knowledge (e g., Kunda, 1990). 2) Judgments must fit perceivers’ theories
about how the
social world works. People will not make dispositional attributions, for
example, when
doing so is theoretically incongruent with the social context
(Leyens, Yzerbyt, Vilain, &
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Gonsalves, in press). 3) Judgments must meet cultural expectations about who can judge
and how they ought to do so. Jurors are expected to judge defendants, not vice versa, and
their judgments are expected to be based on trial evidence, not personal opinion
4) Judgments must maintain the integrity of important personal beliefs, including values,
self-concepts, and group identities, including gender and race (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992).
For example, white supremacists, whose beliefs about racial superiority are highly central
and important to the self, are unlikely to make favorable judgments of non-whites because
doing so would violate these self-relevant identities.
When people are faced with making judgments that violate these four criteria for
judging, they experience a decreased sense ofjudgeability—that is, they feel unable to
judge. When judgeability is low, people may try to avoid judgments, either by making
non-judgments (e g., fence-sitting) or by flat out refusing to judge. However, when people
feel unable to judge and they cannot opt out ofjudging, they will typically try to find a
way to restore their sense ofjudgeability and meet the necessary criteria for judging. Until
then, people refrain from judging. So, for example, when people feel unable to judge
because they have received little or no information, they will wait until they believe they
have received more information before making judgments (Yzerbyt, et al., 1994). In
sum, feeling able to judge depends on meeting judgment criteria and has important
consequences for motivation to process social information.
2
Interestingly people need only believe they have more information to feel
able to judge (Yzerbyt, et al.,
1994) Participants who are erroneously led to believe that they have received
“subliminal information
about an impression target feel better able to judge that person, making more
extreme, stereotypic
judgments than people who actually do receive additional information!
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In the following sections, these judgment criteria are applied to power relations,
arguing that powerful people may be especially motivated to maintain their stereotypes in
order to meet relevant judgment criteria. These motives should, in turn, have
consequences for how the powerful attend to information and form impressions of the
powerless (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996a, 1996b).
Power equals entitlement. Cultural expectations about who can judge whom lend
the powerful distinct authority to judge subordinates—social evaluation is an implicit
component of distributing outcomes. Feeling entitled to judge is likely to increase
powerholders’ confidence in their own opinions and prior beliefs, including their
stereotypes. That is, because Western cultures subscribe to beliefs that people gain power
because they have somehow earned it -i.e., because they have requisite skills or
expertise—the powerful may feel that their stereotypes are particularly valid bases of
judgment. Feeling entitled to judge, coupled with a sense of stereotype validity, could lead
the powerful to feel especially able to judge using only their prior stereotypic beliefs.
Unmotivated to attend, the powerful may then pay minimal attention to subordinates with
a net result of stereotyping subordinates by default (i.e., failing to notice stereotype-
inconsistent information).
However, cultural expectations about how the powerful ought to judge may
preclude effortless stereotyping by default. Social norms dictate that powerful
decision-
makers pay enough attention to subordinates to make justifiable decisions.
Powerful
people who distribute outcomes based on arbitrary, or untenable decisions
not only run the
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nsk of poor decisions, but they may find themselves unable to defend these decisions,
unjustifiable poor decisions threaten power. Attending effortfully to subordinates is one
obvious means of ensuring decisions can be justified.
If powerful people are motivated to make justifiable decisions, why not simply
predict they would effortfully individuate their subordinates9 The answer lies in
understanding powerholders’ beliefs about the self, important identities, and the broader
system of power relations between groups. Individuating subordinates could threaten
power-relevant identities by exposing the powerful to information that challenges existing
power relations. In contrast, stereotyping subordinates provides justification for one’s
personal views, the status of one’s social groups and the broader system of power
relations between groups (Jost & Banaji, 1994).
Protecting power via stereotyping. Powerful people may protect their individual
power identities by strategically protecting relevant beliefs about existing power relations
As stated before, powerful people may feel their own opinions are particularly valid bases
ofjudgment-knowledge and expertise are linked to entitlement. If the powerful
individuate subordinates, awareness of stereotype-inconsistent information could challenge
these beliefs. Individuating information about subordinates may be inherently threatening
to beliefs about who should have power over whom. For example, the mere fact that a
black employee has managerial skills (i.e., skills that are inconsistent with traditional
stereotypes about blacks) may threaten a white manager’s power role; employees who are
qualified to have power may usurp managerial positions. For the manager, then,
ignoring
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the employee s managerial skills may reduce the perceived threat to existing power
relations. Thus, the powerful may perceptually “screen out” stereotype-inconsistent
information, dismissing it because it could threaten beliefs about who should have control
In contrast, stereotype-consistent information about subordinates preserves,
perhaps even bolsters existing power identities. If the white manager notes that the black
employee is habitually late to meetings (i.e., behavior that fits stereotypes that blacks are
irresponsible), this information can justify the manager’s beliefs that existing power roles
should remain the same. When powerful people stereotype their subordinates, it justifies
their own personal positions of control. Just as individuation threatens individual power
identities, stereotyping protects them.
In addition, stereotyping subordinates may also protect broader beliefs about social
group power, reducing perceived threats to existing macro-level power relations. To the
extent that people who hold power are likely to belong to traditionally dominant social
groups (e g., whites, males), stereotyping subordinates provides justification for
maintaining the existing power dynamics between groups. If the powerful individuate
powerless people who belong to stigmatized groups, doing so may threaten powerholders’
own social group identities, threatening the self. For example, consider a male manager
who acknowledges a female employee’s analytic skills—information inconsistent with
traditional gender stereotypes that dictate women are analytically weak. Once aware of
this stereotype-inconsistent information, the manager may not only feel a personal threat
to his identity as a powerholder (e g., “She might take my job. ), but he also may
feel a
more general threat to his masculinity (e g., “Men are analytically
superior to women, how
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can she be so good?”). For the powerful, stereotyping maintains self integrity and
simultaneously protects the status quo in power relations between groups and individuals
(Fiske, 1993; Jost & Banaji, 1994).
Motivational tug-of-war. Powerholders face a tension between motives to attend
to subordinates on the one hand, and motives to maintain stereotypes on the other One
means of satisfying both types of processing motives is to pay effortful attention to
stereotype-consistent information, to stereotype by design. If the powerful attend
effortfully to information that fits their prior expectations they can maintain the integrity of
power-relevant identities while also gamering information necessary to justify these
stereotypic judgments.
Summary: Multiple Motives to Stereotype Subordinates
Combining powerholders’ motives to maintain stereotypes with their lack of
outcome-contingency, the cards are stacked against the powerless. Powerful people seem
destined to use stereotype-based impression strategies, possibly biasing impressions of the
powerless. Lacking outcome-dependency, the powerful have no incentive to form accurate
impressions of the powerless. Moreover, pressures to maintain power identities while
simultaneously making effortful decisions ought to encourage active, motivated stereotype
maintenance. In sum, the powerful should be prone to stereotype their
subordinates by
default and by design.
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Supporting Evidence: Power and Stereotyping
Recent investigations provide preliminary support for the hypothesized relationship
between power and stereotyping (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996a) Using a personnel selection
paradigm, we asked Anglo college students to evaluate a number of applicants for an
alleged high-school internship program. In the first study, power was operationalized as
control over applicant outcomes (0%, 30%) and manipulated between-subjects. Applicant
ethnicity was manipulated within-subjects, with each participant evaluating both Anglo
and Hispanic targets. Applicant materials included a standard employment application
(e g., work history, references) and trait information. Type of trait information was
manipulated within subjects such that each applicant was characterized by equal amounts
of stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information. Traits consistent with the
Anglo stereotype included, for example, “neat” and “efficient,” whereas traits consistent
with the Hispanic stereotype included “loud” and “uneducated.” Trait sentences were
created to fit the context of the work situation and then presented to participants in the
guise of co-worker comments, handwritten on individual postmarked-cards. Participants
reviewed application materials aloud into an audio-recorder. Participants were instructed
to say each trait sentence aloud and then to comment about it. The primary dependent
measure was participant attention in response to each type of trait information
(stereotype-consistent vs. stereotype-inconsistent). Attention was measured
by timing
participants’ audio-recorded responses to the trait sentences.
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Results of the study support the hypothesized relationship between power and
stereotyping (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996a). Participants who believed that they controlled
applicant outcomes paid significantly more attention to stereotype-consistent information,
compared to participants who did not control outcomes. Attention to stereotype-
inconsistent information remained relatively low, regardless of power. This pattern of
attention to stereotype-relevant information suggests that powerful participants
stereotyped applicants by design.
A second study using the same paradigm found that individual differences in trait
dominance mimicked these effects (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996a). People high in trait
dominance enjoy controlling others’ outcomes (Gough, 1987). We argued that high-
dominance perceivers might behave as though they have outcome control, even when
control is not expressly conferred. If so, high-dominance perceivers ought to stereotype
applicants in the absence of actual outcome-control.
Participants were first pretested for trait dominance using a widely accepted
measure—the CPI dominance scale (Gough, 1987). Participants identified by extreme
scores (high and low) were recruited to evaluate intern applicants, as in the previous
study. The design and procedures were exactly as before with one exception: there was no
manipulation of outcome control. All participants believed that the researchers were
simply interested in their opinions, and no outcome control was inferred in the
experimental instructions. Despite this induced outcome-control ambiguity,
trait
dominance significantly altered participant impression strategies.
High-dominance
participants paid significantly more attention to stereotype-consistent
information.
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compared to low-dominance participants. Again, attention to stereotype-consistent
information remained the same, regardless of dominance. These findings indicate that
individual differences in control-relevant personality characteristics are analogous to
situational control. Notably, situational and dispositional control may interact to
exaggerate these stereotyping effects, but this remains to be tested
Together, these two studies provide important initial evidence that outcome-
control motivates the powerful to stereotype subordinates effortfully. However, these
studies leave many unanswered questions . First, these manipulations of power do not
included necessary comparison manipulations to test the possibility that powerholders
stereotype subordinates by default. Recall, in the previous studies, participants were never
contingent on targets. Without such a comparison group, it is not possible to determine
whether or not the powerful participants in these studies were ignoring stereotype-
inconsistent information. Although the present analysis of power and stereotyping
presumes the powerful engage in both kinds of biased impression formation, stereotyping
by default and by design, previous studies do not provide empirical support for
stereotyping subordinates by default.
A less important design issue concerns the attention measures used in the previous
studies. Although think-aloud protocols do reflect attention processes, they also include
“noise” that may be unrelated to attention strategies, unnecessarily increasing error
variance. For example, in the previous research, think-aloud responses were
collected in
the experimenter’s presence. These responses would necessarily be
contaminated by
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participant concerns over self-presentation. More sensitive measures of attention could
easily be adapted to address this concern.
A third question relates to the hypothesized relationship between power,
motivation, and judgeability. The present theory assumes powerful people stereotype
subordinates by design because 1 ) it fulfills motives to protect power roles, and 2) it
increases perceived ability to judge subordinates. Data from the previous studies provide
no insight into these important issues.
Finally, although powerful participants in the previous studies paid more attention
to stereotype-consistent information, their attention strategies only marginally influenced
their impressions of subordinates. Powerful participants formed somewhat more
homogeneous impressions of applicants, but these impressions were not more stereotypic,
compared to people who did not have control. In fact, both groups appear to have been
making non-judgments; responses to bipolar trait ratings were tightly clustered about the
midpoint of the measurement scales (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996a).
The lack of relationship between attention and impression ratings could be
explained any number of ways. One possibility is that participants simply did not feel able
to express public judgments because the situation—judging job applicants was wholly
unfamiliar to them. Measurement incongruence between the attention scores and public
ratings is another feasible explanation. Attention measures reflect non-conscious
processes; participants are unlikely to be aware of or to control their own attention
processes, even if they do recognize the experimenters’ interest in them. As such,
attention
measures reflect implicit cognitive processes. In contrast,
participants are not only aware
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of their publicly expressed impressions, but they may intentionally monitor and control
these responses in experimental contexts. Target impression ratings reflect explicit
cognitive processes. Recently, theorists have questioned the presumed relationship
between implicit and explicit measures of cognitive processing. Little if any statistical
relationship exists between these two types of measures with regard to stereotyping
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). The lack of relationship between powerholders’ attention to
stereotypic information and impression ratings in prior research may simply reflect reality.
General Aims and Hypotheses of the Present Research
The present research aims to extend prior research and further our understanding
of power and motivated stereotyping. The primary goal of these studies is to develop a
paradigm for capturing both stereotyping by default and by design, using more accurate
measures of attention. Previous research has examined powerful and powerless perceivers
in separate studies. Combining these two manipulations (i.e., control and contingency) in
one analysis is necessary to assess the two hypothesized forms of stereotype-based bias.
The computerized paradigm adopted in each of these studies includes a range of power
role manipulations, allowing tests of stereotyping by default and by design.
A second goal of this research is to develop measures ofjudgeability. If powerful
people are truly motivated to maintain their stereotypes about subordinates, they should
feel better able to judge, and this should be reflected in judgment confidence with regard
to stereotype-relevant trait ratings. Furthermore, judgment confidence should be related to
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powerholders impression strategies. More precisely, powerful people who attend to
stereotype-consistent information should feel especially confident in judging subordinates
These issues are explored in Studies 3 and 4.
A final goal of the present research is to explore self-reported impression motives
as they relate to attention strategies. Theoretically, the powerful are predicted to have
stereotype-maintenance impression motives whereas the powerless are predicted to have
accuracy-driven impression motives. In previous research, these motives have been
assumed, but not tested. Two studies implement self-report measures of impression
motivation, providing a first glimpse into the conscious impression goals that characterize
social power.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1
Initial evidence supports the hypothesized relationship between power (i.e
,
outcome control) and stereotyping: participants who believe they have outcome control
pay more attention to stereotype-consistent information about job applicants (Goodwin &
Fiske, 1996a). This pattern of results fits the predicted model of stereotyping subordinates
by design, by effortfiilly confirming group stereotypes about subordinates. However, these
studies lack an appropriate comparison group for testing the hypothesis that powerful
perceivers stereotype subordinates by default, by ignoring stereotype-inconsistent
information. More specifically, testing stereotyping by default requires comparing the
powerful to a group of perceivers who are, according to predictions, motivated to
individuate by attending to stereotype-inconsistent information. If powerful people pay
significantly less attention to stereotype-inconsistent information than perceivers who
individuate, this difference in attention can be interpreted as stereotyping by default. The
primary goal of this first study is to develop a paradigm including a relevant comparison
group for testing both hypothesized stereotype mechanisms, by default and by design.
A secondary issue of concern with prior research is the operationalization and
measurement of attention via think-aloud protocols. Although useful, this type of
attention
measure does not reflect perceiver attention alone. By requiring participants to
verbalize
their responses to trait information aloud, in the presence of the
experimenter, these
measures necessarily capture more than attention processes.
As a result, these measures
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may be less sensitive to perceivers actual attention. People do not typically engage in such
public reflection during social interactions. This factor makes these measures somewhat
difficult to generalize to non-experimental settings. The present study addresses this issue
by computerizing the presentation of trait information and measuring participant reaction
times electronically and unobtrusively.
Overview
For this first complete test of stereotyping by default and by design, I asked
students to participate in a study of task allocation in working groups. In this
within-subjects design, groups of participants expected to meet at the end of the
experimental session to play three different work roles simultaneously. To unconfound
these relationships, participants believed they would play the roles in round-robin fashion,
with regard to different targets; participants would be a (powerful) task distributor
distributing work tasks to some targets, a (powerless) receiver performing tasks for other
targets, or an (unrelated) observer uninvolved in the distribution or execution of tasks .
1
Thus, participants had both superiors and subordinates at the same time. Participants also
believed that they could win a prize based on their effectiveness at performing the tasks
they were assigned by their distributors. Receivers would be judged by the experimenters,
but they could increase their chances of winning a prize if the distributor gave them a
1 These role names were chosen to describe the relationships as clearly as possible
without
using labels that would imply status (e.g., teacher, student). The original French role
names
were: allocateur, executeur, and observateur.
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particular type of task to perform. That is, distributors controlled receivers' chances of
winning by controlling how the tasks would be allocated (asymmetrical outcome control)
Before the alleged group meeting to distribute and perform tasks, participants were given
a chance to "get to know" each other by reviewing trait information about the other
members of the group and responding to several impression items.
Design
The design of the study was complex, involving the manipulation of independent
variables both within- and between- subjects, as well as within-targets. The rationale for
using this somewhat unusual design are outlined below.
Independent Variables
Power Role
Power role (distributor, receiver, observer) was manipulated within subjects, with
participants believing they would assume each role in relation to another participant and
vice versa. In the (powerful) distributor role, participants believed they controlled the
receivers' chances of receiving a prize by means of allocating a task that would improve
the receivers' chances of receiving a prize. Conversely, in the (powerless) receiver
role,
participants believed they were dependent on the distributor for receiving a
task that
would improve their own chances to win. Finally, vis-a-vis observers,
participants were
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told that they would passively observe a task allocation interaction and therefore neither
controlled another nor were dependent on another for that particular alleged interaction
Participants received information about and evaluated a total of four targets: one
distributor, two receivers, and one observer. Pilot testing of a similar study suggested that
this was the maximum number of targets participants could evaluate without becoming
confused. The order of target roles was counterbalanced between subjects, with the
constraint that participants would not evaluate the two receivers in consecutive order
Target Group Membership
Gender was selected as the salient target category because it would be easy to
manipulate in the context of the experiment without arousing suspicion as to the true
nature of the hypotheses regarding stereotyping. While the proposed model of power and
stereotyping would not predict any direct effects of participant or target gender, the
literature regarding perceptions of power suggests that men and women view power in
different ways (Yoder & Kahn, 1992). Thus there was a possibility that these gender
differences might have indirect effects on how the participants responded to being in
different power roles. Given these possible effects, the goal to examine powerful
perceivers in a within-subjects design, and the unfeasibility of fully crossing gender with
power role within subjects (i.e., increasing the number of targets), a compromise design
was employed. Target gender was randomized between subjects for the distributor and
observer roles, with the constraint that each participant received one male and one
female
across the two targets. For the two receiver targets, gender was randomized
within
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subjects. This design would allow a full within-subjects test of any possible interactions
between indirect gender effects and the main independent variable of interest (i e
,
powerful perceivers perceptions of powerless distributors).
Trait Information
Trait information was manipulated within target. For each target, participants
received 8 trait sentences pretested for valence and consistency with gender roles
(Appendix A). Only traits that uniquely described members of each group were selected
for the study. Valence and consistency were crossed and randomized within target such
that for each target half of the information was positive, half was negative, half was
consistent with the target's gender stereotype, and half was inconsistent.
Dependent Variables
Attention to trait information and participant ratings of targets served as the
primary dependent variables of interest to this study. Both measures were collected and
recorded via computer. The exact nature of these measures is described below.
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Hypotheses
Impression Strategies
Power-Irrelevant Observer Targets
Participants’ impression strategies, stereotype- vs. attribute-based, were predicted
to vary as a function of the target's role, with observer targets providing the baseline for
comparison. Participants evaluating information about observer targets should pay low
overall attention to the information, with a possible main effect for valence. That is,
because observer targets were unrelated to the allocation of any tasks, these participants
should adopt a minimal effort strategy. Consistent with previous findings in the social
cognitive literature, these disinterested perceivers could show a slight attention bias in
favor of negative information, which tends to be more generally salient than positive
information, all other things being equal (for a review of salience effects, see Fiske &
Taylor, 1991). Overall attention should be very low, compared to participants evaluating
targets in the other two roles.
Powerful Distributor Targets
Participants evaluating distributor targets (i.e., powerful targets who controlled the
participants' outcomes) were predicted to adopt accuracy motives and hence to individuate
distributors. Overall attention to the distributor should be greater than
attention to the
observer, and qualified by a specific increase in attention to
stereotype-inconsistent
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information. Participants evaluating the powerful should be motivated (due to their
outcome dependence) to attend to information that affords more prediction and control
Increased attention to inconsistent information about distributors, relative to that of the
irrelevant observer targets, would indicate an individuating impression strategy
Some recent research suggests, however, that when powerless perceivers are
evaluatively dependent (e g., they have self-esteem outcomes at stake) they may be
sensitive to, or particularly interested in, positive information about the powerful. Learning
that the powerful have positive attributes affords a certain level of self-protection from
potentially uncontrollable negative interactions and outcomes (Stevens & Fiske, 1996).
The power manipulation in this study was intended to reduce participant concerns over
evaluative control by having the powerful target simply allocate tasks, as opposed to
explicitly evaluating the powerless participant's performance. Instead, participants believed
the experimenter would be the only person making explicit performance evaluations.
Assuming this manipulation works, one would not predict any valence effects for
distributor targets.
Powerless Receiver Targets
The predictions regarding powerful participants' attention to their (powerless)
receiver targets are of greatest interest to this study. The proposed theory predicts that the
powerful ought to be motivated to process target information stereotypical^, but
to do so
effortfiilly, increasing their perceived ability to judge. Social judgeability research
suggests
that feeling informed is an important judgeability standard, one that
might be met easily by
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paying attention to available information. It is reasonable to assume that being in a
position that requires decision-making would elicit a standard to feel informed For this
reason, powerful perceivers' attention to receiver targets should be greater than that of
attention to observer targets, but about equal to that of distributor targets
However, unlike accuracy-motivated perceivers attending to powerful targets,
powerful perceivers should be motivated to attend to stereotype-consistent information
that confirms their stereotype beliefs. Thus perceivers evaluating the powerless should pay
increased attention to stereotype-consistent information, relative to the other two targets.
Finally, powerful people may show some sensitivity to the valence of trait
information, but this hypothesis was exploratory and non-directional. Previous research on
power and impression formation has neglected this variable, confounding valence and
consistency (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996a). It is therefore difficult to predict whether or not
powerful perceivers will be sensitive to information valence and if so, how.
Impression Ratings
Impression ratings were also predicted to vary as a function of target role
Participants evaluating observer targets should not feel particularly entitled to judge the
observer because of 1) their non-interdependent role, and 2) their overall lack
of attention
to these targets. This low sense ofjudgeability should lead to low
variability in the
impression ratings with most ratings clustered around the scale mean.
There is a possibility
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that participants evaluating observer targets would adopt a slight positivity bias, rating
observers somewhat above the mean of the scale
In contrast to rating observers, participants rating either distributors or receivers
should feel able to judge because they have attended more to the available information,
and consequently their judgments should not be tightly clustered about the scale mean
Judgment variability and extremity for distributor and receiver targets should reflect the
participants' processing goals and the reality of the available information. Therefore,
powerful participants, who are presumed to favor consistent information, should make low
variability, stereotype-consistent impression ratings of receiver targets. In comparison,
powerless participants, who are presumed to adopt an accuracy-oriented attention
strategy, should make more variable, stereotype-inconsistent impression ratings of
powerful distributors.
Whether powerful participants will feel better able to judge, compared to the
powerless, is subject to exploration. Because powerful people are in a socially sanctioned
position to judge whereas the powerless are not, we might expect the powerful to feel
more able to make extreme ratings. On the other hand, the context of the experimental
setting coupled with the fact that both groups are free look at the information as long
as
they wish may lead both groups to make equally extreme impression ratings.
Judgeability is hypothesized to be an important factor in powerholders’
stereotyping of subordinates, and as such deserves empirical attention.
However, because
this was an exploratory study, direct measures of
judgeability (eg., direct confidence
ratings) were postponed for fear that they might
contaminate the attention data. Direct
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measures might make participants overly concerned with confidence issues Instead,
judgeability was measured only indirectly in this study. Participants who feel less able to
judge should make more moderate judgments, as found in prior judgeability research
Method
Participants
Participants were 51 undergraduate psychology students at the Universite
Catholique de Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. Participants received optional
course credit. Eight of the original participants (4 men, 4 women) were dropped from
analyses because their overall attention scores were 3 or more standard deviations above
the mean (see results below). In addition, the data for one participant who reported French
as a second language were dropped. A total of 42 participants remained in the final
sample.
Procedure
Participants arrived at the lab in groups of six to twelve
and were seated in
alternating chairs in front ofMacintosh LCii computers
Instructions on the computer
screen directed participants to wait quietly
until the researcher indicated they could begin
With the exception of a brief introduction by the
experimenter, the procedures were
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carried out on the computer using SuperLab software for the Macintosh computer All
materials and instructions were presented in French.
A female experimenter first explained to participants that the majority of the study
would take place on the computers, but that participants would break into "work groups"
at the end of the study to distribute and perform some tasks. Participants were encouraged
to let the experimenter know if they had any questions about or problems with their
computer by quietly raising their hands at any time during the experiment Participants
were then instructed to follow the directions on the computer screen and begin the first
phase of the study.
After an initial task to familiarize participants with the keyboard, participants
learned that they were participating in a study of task allocation in work groups. They
believed that the latter part of the study would involve an interaction with other
participants during which they would allocate and execute various work tasks; in reality
this interaction never took place. The three general phases of the experiment were
described to participants as follows. In Phase I, participants would "tell us about
themselves," in Phase II participants would learn about other members in their alleged
workgroups, and in phase III, they would break into groups in an adjacent room to decide
who would perform the various tasks.
Phase I
In the first phase, participants answered a series of
self-relevant questions,
including demographic questions assessing gender, age, and
language skills. Afterward,
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the computer instructions explained that participants would next be asked to respond to a
personality questionnaire, a 140-item test allegedly developed by industrial psychologists
to study the characteristics of people in work environments. In its original form, the
counterfeit questionnaire was "too long to administer to each participant," so the
computer would supposedly select twenty items at random for each participant to
complete. Each item was a self-descriptive statement (e g., “Sometimes I am lost in
thought and do not realize that others are speaking to me”). Participants were asked to
indicate whether or not each statement described them by indicating yes or no In fact, the
questions were bogus and served only to provide a cover story for the later presentation of
trait information about other members in the study.
Phase II
After completing the "personality questionnaire," participants were told they would
have a chance to get to know the other members of their group before the actual
interaction. Participants were told that they would receive a profile for each member of
their group with a codename (presumably to protect the anonymity of participants
responses), and an indication of that person's role (e.g., receiver) in the upcoming
interactions. The profile also contained the target's gender and year in college. French
nouns that were both connotatively and linguistically masculine or feminine were
selected
as codenames to enhance the salience of the target's gender (e g., camion
- truck, for a
male target, and dentelle - lace, for a female target). In addition,
gender-neutral language
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was avoided and all directions regarding the targets were presented in both masculine and
feminine form (e g., “his/her”) to enhance the salience of target gender
Following the target profile, participants received a series of 8 gender-relevant trait
sentences developed from the pretested traits. Participants believed that each sentence,
randomly presented by the computer, had been endorsed as self-descriptive by the target in
Phase I. Participants read each statement one at a time on the screen, pushing a designated
key to continue when they were ready to advance to the next sentence. Instructions
encouraged participants to consider the information at their own pace.
Immediately after reading the trait sentences, participants responded to a series of
13 impression items (Appendix B). These items were in the form of statements similar to
those used as target trait information. Participants rated the degree to which each
statement described the target on a 7-point scale. Eight of the items pretested as gender-
relevant; half of these were positive, and halfwere negative. Two of items were gender
neutral, one positive, one negative. Finally, three items simply asked how much
participants believed they would enjoy working with the target.
Participants followed this procedure, reading profiles, trait information, and
answering impression items, for each of the four targets. Afterward, participants
completed a written debriefing questionnaire designed to assess overall suspicion. Once all
participants in the session had completed the computerized procedures, the
experimenter
explained that there would not actually be a group interaction. Participants were
then fully
debriefed as to the purpose of the study, given experimental course
credit for their
participation, and dismissed from the laboratory.
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Results
Attention to Trait Information
Participants’ attention to the trait information for each target was recorded by the
SuperLab program to the hundredth of a second. Timing began with the presentation of
the stimulus sentence on the screen and ended when participants pressed the designated
key (C) to continue to the next screen. Timing scores were created for each target by
averaging participants' attention to each type of trait information (valence x gender
stereotype consistency). Thus, each participant had four attention scores per target
positive/consistent, negative/consistent, positive/inconsistent, and negative/inconsistent.
The times for the two receivers were averaged to create a composite score Case
selection was based on the distribution of attention scores around the mean for each
timing score across all targets (e.g., each participant’s total attention to positive/consistent
information across the three target roles). Participants with scores more than three
standard deviations above the mean on any of the four (valence x consistency) scores were
deleted from the final data set before further analyses .
3
2 Neither target nor participant gender had any effect on the results, hence
allowing for the
collapse of these two scores.
3 As previously mentioned, 8 participants were considered outliers
based on this test and
were removed from the final data set. Originally, only those participants
who were outliers
on all four scores (in this case, 5 participants) were to be
excluded. However, the remaining
participants who were outliers on any of the scores (3 participants) had undue
influence on
the variabilities. Since removing the remaining three outlier
participants from the data di
not change the overall pattern of means but simply
reduced the variance, it seemed
reasonable to omit these cases despite increasing the number of
cases identified as outliers.
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Attention scores for each target role were submitted to a within-subjects analysis
of variance using the SPSS-X MANOVA procedure Target role, information valence and
consistency were entered as within-subjects factors. 4 As Table 2. 1 indicates, there was a
main effect for information consistency such that participants paid more attention overall
to stereotype consistent rather than inconsistent information (M=5.17 and A/=4.79
seconds, respectively) regardless of target role or valence. The hypothesized differences in
overall attention by target role did not emerge in this analysis. The main effect for
consistency was qualified by a significant role x consistency interaction. Two other higher-
order interactions involved the role manipulation. Role interacted significantly with
valence, and marginally with consistency and valence in a three-way interaction.
Role x Consistency Interaction
Attention to information by stereotype consistency was mostly as predicted (Figure
2.1). Attention to inconsistent information was equivalent for the baseline observer
(A/=4.35) and the powerless receiver (M—4.70) targets. As predicted, participants
evaluating powerful distributors paid significantly more attention to inconsistent
information (M=5.33) as compared to both observer (/«=2. 59,/?=.02) and receiver
(^2=168,^=05) targets. Contrary to the hypotheses, attention to consistent information
remained statistically equivalent across the three target roles. Thus the expected
increase
in attention to consistent information about powerless receivers (i.e.,
stereotyping by
design) did not emerge. However, attention to consistent information
in this within-
4 There were no effects of participant gender for any of the
analyses.
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subjects analysis may have been contaminated by participant fatigue effects, as discussed
below.
Role x Valence Interaction
The interaction between role and valence (Figure 2.2) suggests that the role
manipulation had a significant influence on participants' attention to positive information
Attention to negative information was statistically equivalent across the three target roles
Attention to positive information, in contrast, increased in the two power-related roles.
The increase in attention to positive information for receivers (A/=5.03) relative to
observers (A/=4.43) was only marginally significant (^2=1 49,/?=. 10). However,
participants paid significantly more attention to positive information about powerful
distributors (Af=5.51) as compared to the baseline observer targets (t82=2.61, p<. 005).
While participants tended to pay more attention to positive information about distributors
than receivers (M=5.03), this trend was not statistically significant. This pattern is
consistent with previous research (Stevens & Fiske, 1996) and suggests that when
perceivers become interdependent, positive information becomes increasingly more
important.
Relative differences in attention to positive versus negative information as a
function of target role emerged for the observer and distributor targets, but not for
receiver targets. When participants evaluated unrelated observers, they paid more
attention to negative (M=5.08) than positive (M=4.43) information, fe=165,/?= 05. This
trend is consistent with the hypotheses and with prior research indicating
that negative
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information is generally more informative than positive information, at least for uninvolved
observers. While there were no differences in attention to positive versus negative
information for powerless receiver targets, participants evaluating powerful distributors
paid significantly more attention to positive (Af=5.51) than negative (M=4.74)
information, 87,p=. 05. This pattern is a reversal of the baseline observer condition
and calls into question whether the current operationalization successfully manipulated
task rather than evaluative outcome dependence. Although previous research has shown a
positivity bias in impression ratings only under evaluative outcome dependence (Stevens &
Fiske, 1996), it is possible that this observed increase in attention to positive information
about powerful distributors reflects a heightened concern with distributors’ evaluations,
and their role in the upcoming interaction to allocate tasks.
Role x Valence x Consistency Interaction
The marginal three-way interaction between role, valence, an consistency (Figure
2.3) illustrates the differences in attention patterns for different target roles. When
evaluating observers
,
participants paid the least attention to positive/inconsistent
information, significantly less than all other types of information. This pattern of attention
to negative and consistent information is in keeping with previous research and fits a
pattern of stereotype-based processing. The pattern changes when participants evaluate
powerless receiver targets. Participants evaluating receivers significantly
increased their
attention to both consistent and inconsistent positive information (relative
to baseline
observers), but their attention to consistent and inconsistent negative
information remained
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the same. Thus people with power are not evidencing a valence bias, but they continue to
attend to information that confirms rather than disconfirms their expectations In contrast
to both observer and receiver targets, participants evaluating powerful distributor targets
paid the most attention to positive/inconsistent information, perhaps reflecting wishful
thinking on their part. In fact, attention to positive/inconsistent information was
significantly higher than attention to all three other types of information for distributors,
which were themselves statistically equivalent. This is an exact reversal of the profile for
observer targets for the four types of information. These findings clearly indicate that the
three different types of relationships (none, asymmetrically powerful, and asymmetrically
powerless) have important consequences for attention strategies in impression formation.
Other Attention Analyses
A target-by-target between participants MANOVA of the attention data suggests
that participant fatigue influenced these data. The attention patterns begin to fade in the
third target and no longer appear for the fourth target. Because these fatigue effects could
be masking the direct effects of the power manipulations, it is relevant to consider the
effects for the first target in a between-participants analysis.
The data for the first target were submitted to MANOVA as before except, for
this analysis, power role was a between-subjects factor. This analysis yielded two
two-way
interactions (role and valence; role and consistency), similar to those
for the within-
subjects analysis across targets. Three important differences emerged
as compared to the
within-subjects analysis. First, planned comparisons of the overall
differences in attention
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by role revealed that participants were paying equal attention to powerful distributors
(M=6.45) and powerless receivers (M=5.95), as predicted Moreover, attention to
unrelated observers (M=4.84) was significantly lower than attention to distributors
(*39=2.33,/?=.02) or receivers (*39=1.61,/?=.05). These findings strongly support the
hypothesis that both powerful and powerless participants would be uninterested in
observers who were unrelated to the allocation of tasks.
The pattern of means with regard to the role x valence interaction (^.39=9. 28,
p=.001) was basically the same in this analysis, with one exception Participants evaluating
observer targets no longer showed a negativity bias, instead paying equal attention to both
positive and negative information. This likely reflects participants’ overall lack of interest
in these unrelated targets.
Finally, the two-way interaction between role and consistency (F2 ,39=8. 67, p=. 001)
supports the hypothesis that powerful perceivers stereotype by design. Participants
attending to irrelevant observers (Figure 2.4) paid equal attention to consistent and
inconsistent information. Powerful participants increased their attention to consistent
information relative to observers, and as a result, the predicted increase in attention to
consistent information for receivers (M=6.3) relative to observers (M=4.84) was
statistically significant (*39=2. 94,/?=. 02.).
Importantly, the reverse pattern occurred for attention to stereotype-inconsistent
information. There was no statistical difference in attention to
inconsistent information
about powerless receiver targets (M=4.84) versus power-irrelevant
observer targets
(M=5.63), *39=.90, ns. In comparison, participants evaluating powerful
distributors paid
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significantly more attention to inconsistent information (Af=7.83), compared to perceivers
evaluating the other two targets, (t39=2.65, p< 01) Relative to powerless perceivers, who
were predicted to individuate, the powerful behaved as power-irrelevant observers,
ignoring stereotype-inconsistent information. As predicted, the powerful stereotyped
subordinates by default, as well as by design.
Impression Ratings
Factor Analyses
The eight gender-relevant trait rating items were selected from the impression
questions and submitted to principal components factor analysis, using varimax rotation,
the analysis yielded three factors. After considering the loading matrix and the scree plot
of eigenvalues for each factor, a two factor-solution was chosen. The resulting loadings
indicated separate factors for positive and negative items. Participants’ answers to the
positive and negative items were each averaged to create composite scores for the
subsequent analyses.
Gender-Relevant Items
Positive and negative composite scores were identified by role, and, as with
the
attention data, scores were averaged across the two receiver targets.
These were
submitted to MANOVA, with role and valence as within-subjects factors. The analysis
yielded only a main effect for valence such that participants were
more willing to rate
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targets positively (M=4.47) than negatively (AY=3.73), regardless of target role Levene's
test of homogeneity indicates, furthermore, no differences in variability among the groups
on these responses. These data disappointingly fail to support the hypotheses regarding
judgeability.
Gender-Irrelevant Items
Of the remaining five items from the impression questions, two were gender
irrelevant, and three items simply assessed how much the participant was looking forward
to interacting with the target. There were no effects for target role on the latter three
items. Analysis of the two gender-irrelevant items, however, produced not only a main
effect for valence, but a role x valence interaction (F2,<s0=25.67,/?=.OOO). While the small
number of items precludes further interpretation of these differences, the fact that there
were differences suggests that the gender-relevant items may have been too heavy-handed,
leading participants to be uncomfortable about rating targets on gender-relevant attributes.
Discussion
The results of this first study provide mixed support for the hypotheses. On the
one hand, the timing data are generally as predicted, with
powerful participants putting
more attention resources toward stereotyping powerless targets
and powerless
participants using equally effortful strategies to individuate
powerful targets. On the other
hand, the null results for the impression ratings suggest
that another unanticipated
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judgeability standard, namely not expressing strong sexist evaluations, may have prevented
the participants from making stereotype-relevant judgments, at least publicly, despite their
role or the amount of available information
Three important conclusions may be drawn, however, from this first within-
subjects test of power relations and impression formation. The fact that individual
participants changed their attention strategies contingent upon the target's power relation
is strong evidence that these roles lead to different types of processing strategies Previous
studies have explored this variable only in between-subjects designs, and then comparing
only one side of the power relation to a control condition (Fiske & Depret, 1996;
Goodwin & Fiske, 1996a). In this study we are able to compare how individuals respond
to both sides of the relationship, and thus the argument that people adopt different
strategies as a function of their role is compelling.
Of equal importance is the fact that powerful people do not appear to be using
necessarily effortless strategies to form impressions of those they control. The results of
the between-subjects analysis (target one only) clearly show that perceivers are not only
less interested in the power irrelevant observers, but that the powerful and the powerless
are equally motivated to attend to one another. What differs for participants assuming the
different power roles is not how much they attend, but rather what they attend to For the
powerless, attention is focused on individuating the powerful, gathering stereotype-
inconsistent information to get a more accurate impression. For the powerful,
effort is
concentrated on stereotyping powerless targets via stereotype-consistent
information. In
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all, these data provide strong evidence that the powerful stereotype subordinates both by
default and by design.
Finally, the three-way interaction found in the within-subjects analysis highlights
the importance of positively valenced information for both the powerful and the
powerless. Although the study was designed to create a non-evaluative form of outcome
dependency, powerless perceivers paid the most attention to positive/inconsistent
information. This suggests that the manipulation may have indirectly caused participants
to worry about powerholders’ implicit evaluations in distributing tasks More specifically,
if participants believed the distributors’ private evaluations would influence whether or not
they allocated a “good” task (i.e., one that would increase the participants’ chances of
winning the prize), then participants are likely to have worried about how distributors
privately evaluated them. Concern over the upcoming interaction could be responsible for
this increased attention to positive information; focusing on the positive could help
participants maintain positive expectations for their upcoming task interactions (Stevens &
Fiske, 1996).
That powerful participants increased attention to positive information, above that
of the baseline observer targets, is intriguing. The present data preclude empirical
explanation for this finding, but several hypotheses are plausible. One possibility is that
powerful people are concerned with making fair decisions, weighing the good
with the bad
could achieve a sense of fair evaluation. While this is possible, it posits
separate
mechanisms for the increases in attention to positive information by the
powerful and the
powerless. A more parsimonious explanation is that both the powerful and
the powerless
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are concerned with having positive interactions, and the increase in attention is linearly
related to the level of interdependence for each role. Because powerless people are
dependent on the interaction for winning the prize, we can expect them to be more
invested in having a positive interaction than people in the powerful role. Again, these
explanations are pure conjecture and future studies should consider participants’ reported
goals in each condition to address this issue.
The impression rating results indicate complex problems for measuring explicit
stereotyping in this context. As mentioned in the results section, participants showed a
strong positivity reporting bias to the gender-relevant items, and the only differences due
to the role manipulation were found for items that were gender-irrelevant. One might
conclude that the gender-relevant items were too blatantly sexist for participants to feel
able to judge. In future applications of the paradigm, consideration should be given to
developing items that are less heavy-handed. Additionally, unobtrusive measures of
judgeability need to be added in order to determine how power role affects judgeability.
Study 2 addresses these issues in an extension of the paradigm to race stereotyping.
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Table 2.1
Study 1 : Attention Data MANOVA Results
Within-subjects Analysis
Effect df F ArfSerror
Role 2 1.63 4AT^
Consistency 1
_
_ _ **
5.60 3.19
b
Role x Consistency 1 6.29*** 3.02b
Valence 2 0.02 2. 1
7
a
Role x Valence 2 6.02*** 3.46a
Consistency x Valence 1 0.19 3.70b
Role x Consistency x Valence 2 2.52* 3.06a
V 10
-
j)< 05
/N ,p<oi
adf=82
bdf=41
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2
Overview
The primary goals of Study 2 were to extend the paradigm to power
relations between members of different racial groups and to improve the impression rating
measures. In this replication of Study 1, Anglo-American participants were recruited to
evaluate both ingroup (Anglo-American) and outgroup (African-American) targets within
the same experimental context as Study 1 . Some procedures were modified to improve
upon the previous study.
Design
Independent Variables
Power Role
Power role was randomized within subjects and operationalized as in Study 1, with
participants evaluating three types of targets, powerful task distributors, powerless
task
receivers, and power-irrelevant observers. Although labels for the power-relevant
roles
were translated into meaningful English labels for this study, the
operationalizations of
outcome control and outcome contingency remained exactly the
same.
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The total number of targets evaluated by each participant was reduced from 4 to 3,
participants rated one target per role. This was intended to reduce possible fatigue effects,
as evidenced by the attention results in Study 1
.
Target Group Membership
Racial group was manipulated as the salient target social category. Target race was
counterbalanced across targets and between subjects, resulting in eight race-mix groups of
targets (Table 3.1). Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of these
combinations.
Target race was made salient in two ways. First, codenames were generated to
prime membership in one or the other group. Codenames for Anglo-American targets
included Dove, Swan, and Polar Bear, names for the African-American targets were
Raven, Panther, and Grizzly Bear. In addition to these race-priming codenames, a line
was added to the target profile screen to indicate the target’s race. Because there were no
effects for gender (target or participant) in Study 1, gender was not indicated on the
profile. Instead, all participants believed that members of their group were the same
gender as themselves.
Trait Information
Trait information was manipulated within target, as in Study 1 . A two-step
pretesting procedure was implemented to generate a new set of 24
traits, traits were tested
with regard to their stereotype-consistency (Anglo-American v.
African-American) and
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valence (positive v. negative). First, 20 Anglo undergraduates (half male, half female)
responded to an open-ended questionnaire asking them to list as many traits as they could
that were part of current cultural stereotypes of 6 different groups, including Anglo-
Americans and African-Americans. Based on these free response data, a list of 1 80 traits
was generated for further testing.
In Stage 2 of the trait pretesting, a sample of 24 Anglo-American undergraduates
responded to separate questionnaires assessing the stereotypicality and positivity of these
traits for each target group (Anglo-American v. African-American). Between-group
ratings were then tested for final selection of stimulus traits. Only those items that 1 ) fell
above the scale mean, and 2) were uniquely descriptive of each group were included in the
final set (Appendix C). The final set of 24 traits was randomly assigned to 3 groups of 8
traits each, crossing race stereotype-consistency and valence (half consistent/inconsistent,
half positive/negative). Trait set presentation was counterbalanced across target role.
Dependent Variables
Attention to trait information and target impression ratings were again the primary
dependent measures. As in Study 1, attention was measured and recorded via computer.
Impression ratings, however, were collected via pen-and-paper questionnaires.
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Impression Rating Items
In addition to the 24 traits used to describe targets, 4 stereotype-relevant and 4
stereotype-irrelevant traits were selected for impression ratings. Stereotype-irrelevant
items were chosen from those traits that were reported as describing both groups equally
well in pretesting. Finally, a proximity-seeking item was included to determine how
positively participants felt about interacting with the target
The new impression rating questionnaire was presented as a pencil-and-paper task
that participants answered between presentations of target information (Appendix D)
Participants rated how much each trait described the target by marking an x on a line with
endpoints denoted by "very much" and " not at all." This method of gathering impression
data has proven more effective for testing variability because participants’ answers are not
restricted to numerical responses, and because participants cannot easily anchor their
responses to one target on their previous responses to another target.
Hypotheses
As the goal of the present study was a modified replication of the previous study,
hypotheses were identical to those of Study 1. Participants evaluating
power-irrelevant
observers should be minimally interested, attend somewhat more to
stereotype-consistent
and negative information, and have low variability impression
ratings that cluster around
the midpoint of the scale.
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Powerless participants evaluating distributor targets should use more individuated
attention strategies, focusing on information that is stereotype inconsistent In particular,
outcome-dependent participants may focus on positive information in anticipation or
hopes for positive interactions with powerful distributors. Impression ratings of distributor
targets should be more extreme in comparison to those of the observer targets, and more
variable.
Attention to receiver targets by powerful participants should reflect stereotyping-
by-default and by-design. Given the results of Study 1, powerful perceivers were not
predicted to show biased attention as a function of information valence. Impression ratings
should be as extreme for receiver targets as for distributor targets, reflecting powerful
perceivers’ ability to judge. However, these ratings should be relatively more stereotype-
consistent because participants will not be attending to information that disconfirms their
expectations.
Responses to the proximity-seeking item are exploratory because no previous data
tell whether power differentially influences desire for social contact. Prior research
supports a general in-group bias such that people prefer (i.e., like) members of their own
social groups (for a review, see Deaux, 1996). In light of this more general bias, a main
effect for target race is likely. In general, participants may prefer to interact with members
of their own social group. However, since powerless people are predicted to be motivated
to try to control their own outcomes, they should also be motivated to interact with
the
powerful regardless of target race. An interaction between target role and target race is
therefore predicted for this measure. Participants evaluating power-irrelevant
observers
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should exhibit in-group favoritism, but participants evaluating powerful distributors should
not. Moreover, powerful perceivers should display more extreme in-group favoritism
toward powerless receivers as compared to participants evaluating power-irrelevant
observers. Because powerful participants are likely to attend to information that confirms
rather than disconfirms their stereotype expectations, they are likely to form more positive
impressions of receivers of their own racial group, compared to receivers from different
racial groups. Relative to observer targets, these attention and impression differences
should translate into more extreme preference for interaction with in-group receivers, and
more avoidance of outgroup receivers.
Method
Participants
Ninety-five Anglo-American participants were recruited from introductory
psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst to participate in
exchange for experimental course credits. As will be discussed, there were problems with
participant reactance in this study, resulting in a high number of participants being
excluded from the analyses. A total of nineteen of the original participants were dropped
from the analyses due to suspicion (5 participants), experimenter error (2
participants), or
out-of-range scores on the attention measures (12 participants, see explanation
below).
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After excluding data for these participants, the final data set included 76 participants, 59
women and 17 men. 1
Procedure
Procedures were identical to Study 1 with four exceptions. First, the study was
translated from the original French into English. Second, participants evaluated only three
targets, one target per role. Third, participants evaluated targets of different racial groups
rather than different genders, as just described. Finally, the revised pencil-and-paper
impression rating questionnaire was administered in place of computerized ratings As an
explanation for switching between the computerized and written materials, participants
were told that these questionnaires were added at the last minute and had yet to be fully
integrated into the computer programming. Instead the programmers allegedly added a
routine to indicate to participants when to fill out the questionnaire for each member of
their group.
1 The ratio of female to male participants reflects the population of students
enrolling in introductory
psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts. With regard to
outlier selection from original data
the proportion of women and men dropped from the analyses (13:6)
was relatively the same as the overall
sample gender ratio.
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Results
Attention to Trait Information
Outlier Selection
Attention to trait information was recorded by the computer in milliseconds, as in
Study 1 . Aggregate attention scores were again calculated based on the stereotype-
consistency and valence of the trait information. This resulted in four attention scores for
each target role: positive/consistent, negative/consistent, positive/inconsistent, and
negative/inconsistent. Outliers on these measures were identified using the same
procedures as in Study 1; any participant with a single attention score (e g., positive/
consistent) greater than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean was considered an outlier
and excluded from further analyses.
Within-subjects Analyses
Attention scores for the 76 remaining participants were submitted to a repeated-
measures MANOVA with target role, trait stereotype consistency, and trait valence as
within-subjects factors. The results of this analysis disappointingly failed to support the
hypotheses (Table 3.2). A main effect for valence revealed participant preference for
negative (M= 3.93) rather than positive (M=3.79) information, Fy , 7j=3.80,p=.05.
The predicted interaction between target role and valence of the
trait information
did emerge, F2,/*f=3.361,p=.03. However, the pattern of means was not
at all as
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expected. Whereas participants evaluating powerful distributors were predicted to prefer
positive information, the pattern reflects no difference in attention to positive (M=3 88)
versus negative (M=3.79) information for these targets, ( 75=. 66, ns. Instead, the only
significant difference in attention occurred for participants evaluating power-irrelevant
observer targets, paying significantly more attention to positive (M=4. 14) rather than
negative (M=3.75) information, t 75=2.99,p< 00\.
The predicted interaction between target power role and stereotype consistency
failed to reach significance, F2.isd=\ .022,/?=. 36. Examination of the overall pattern of
means, however, is useful for evaluating the effectiveness of the role manipulations (Figure
3.1). Post hoc exploration of the cell means revealed no significant differences. However,
attention to stereotype-inconsistent information for powerless receiver targets appears to
contradict the hypotheses. Participants evaluating receivers were predicted to stereotype-
by-default, by ignoring inconsistent information relative to participants evaluating
powerful distributors. In direct contrast to this prediction, attention to stereotype-
inconsistent information about powerless targets (M—4.09) was marginally higher than that
for powerful targets (A</=3 .81). Though not statistically significant, this pattern seriously
questions the effectiveness of the role manipulations.
Between-subiects Analyses
In an effort to explore further the influence of the role manipulations,
between-
subjects analyses of attention to the first target were conducted, as in Study 1.
The
attention scores were re-coded to reflect the information valence
and the stereotypicality
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of the information by race (information stereotype), resulting in four attention scores:
positive/white-stereotype, positive/black-stereotype, negative/white-stereotype,
negative/black-stereotype. These four scores were then submitted to a mixed-design
MANOVA, with target role and target race as between-subjects factors, and information
race and valence as within-subjects factors. The results of this between-subjects analysis
testify that the race manipulation had unintended influences on participants.
The main effect for trait valence was the same as the within-subjects analysis;
participants paid more attention to negative (M=4.26) rather than positive (M=3.80)
information, Fi f7(f=\ 1.73,/?=.001. In addition, the racial stereotypicality of the information
produced two two-way interactions, and one three-way interaction: target role x
information stereotype (F2 , 70=3.83,/?=. 03), target race x information stereotype
(^,70=5.08, /?=. 03), and target role x information stereotype x information valence
(F2 , 70=6. 52,/?=. 003). These higher-order interactions were not predicted by the theory of
power and stereotyping and are, therefore, difficult to interpret (see treatment means in
Table 3.3). However, the fact that stereotypicality of the information was involved in all
three of these higher-order interactions suggests that participants were highly sensitive to
racially stereotypic information.
Impression Ratings
Participant responses to the nine pen-and-paper impression ratings were
scored by
measuring each response to the tenth of an inch. Negatively valenced ratings
were reverse
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scored. Next, two composite scores were calculated for each target based on the pretested
stereotypicality or neutrality of the trait ratings. The four items that pretested as
stereotypic of Anglo- and African-Americans were summed to create a race-stereotyping
impression score. Because of the orthogonal nature of the items chosen for this scale, and
the reverse-scoring of negative items, overall scores may be interpreted as stereotyping
targets with regard to positive Anglo stereotypes. The four items that pretested race-
neutral were similarly summed to create a race-neutral impression score The remaining
item, how much participants looked forward to meeting the target, was analyzed
separately. These three scores, race-stereotyping, race-neutral, and interest in meeting the
target, were submitted to separate repeated measures ANOVAs, with target role as the
within-subjects factor. There were no significant effects for target role or target race on
participants’ interest in meeting the targets.
Race-Stereotyping Items
As mentioned earlier, impression rating variability served as an indirect measure of
judgeability in the present study. Preliminary examination of rating variability
disappointingly revealed no effects of target role; the hypothesis that powerful people
would feel more able to judge and hence make more extreme ratings was not supported.
Further analysis of the mean race-stereotyping items revealed a significant target
role effect, F/,75=5.5,p=.005. Post hoc comparisons indicated that participants
rated
powerless receiver targets (M=12.47) as most stereotypical^ white/positive, compared to
both powerful distributors (A/=l 1 .32) and power-irrelevant observers
(M=10.93),
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*7.5=3.375, p<. 01, and *75=4.48, /?<01, respectively Ratings of power-irrelevant observers
were statistically equivalent to ratings of powerful distributors, *75=1 .10, ns. This pattern
of results suggests that powerful perceivers were especially motivated to express
positively valenced impressions of receivers.
Additional exploration of these ratings did not reveal any target race effects for the
race-stereotyping items. The nature of the experimental design, in particular
counterbalancing target race between subjects, required separate ANOVAs for each role
to test for target race effects. The ratings for each target role were tested independently
with target race as a between-subjects factor. The three analyses revealed no effects of
target race on these race-stereotyping ratings.
Race-Neutral Items
There were no differences in variability for ratings of race-neutral impression items
as a function of target role. Contrary to the hypotheses, powerful perceivers did not
respond as though they felt more able to judge powerless targets, compared to targets in
the other two roles.
Analysis of participant ratings for the race-neutral items revealed a marginally
significant effect of target role, FZI5<j=2.12,p=.01
.
Post hoc comparisons revealed that
two of the three target groups differed significantly, with powerful
distributors (M- 13.22)
and powerless receivers (M= 12.96) receiving significantly more positive evaluations on
this dimension as compared to observers (M= 12.55) * 75=3.24,p<01, and *75=1 94, /?< 05,
respectively. Evaluations of distributors and receivers did not
differ statistically, *75=1-31,
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ns. This pattern of means suggests that overall, participants evaluated targets more
positively when they anticipated interacting with them in a power relationship
As with the race-stereotype items, the race-neutral items were submitted to
individual analyses to test for target race effects. These analyses revealed no effects of
target race for these ratings.
Other Analyses
Items included in the final debriefing were analyzed to determine whether or not
participants felt comfortable making evaluations in this experimental context. The items
included the following: How useful was the information? ; How certain are you ofyour
responses?. How accurate were your responses?, and How responsible do youfeelfor
your evaluations of others?. Participants responded to these items using a scale of 1 (not
at all) to 5 (very). Mean ratings for each item are presented in Table 3 .4.
Overall the mean responses to these items were very low; none of the means fell at
or above the midpoint of the response scales. This hints at several problems with the
current design. Namely, participants felt very uncertain about their responses in general,
M=\ .81, and unsure of the accuracy of their responses, M=2.52. Hence, the positivity of
participant ratings, described above, is likely a function of participants being
unwilling to
make negative judgments in the context of a mixed-race social context.
64
Discussion
The present study failed to replicate the results of Study 1 . There was no evidence
that participants stereotyped the powerless by-default or by-design To the contrary, the
overall pattern of attention to trait information suggests that people may have been trying
to form accurate impressions of the powerless in this study. Overall attention to
stereotype-inconsistent information was generally high across target power roles, and
especially high in regard to powerless receivers.
Taken as a whole, the results of the study argue that the manipulation of race had
unintended effects on participant impression motives. The low overall certainty in
responses, as well as the attention data showing information race effects, would indicate
this to be the case. In addition, anecdotal data from participant debriefings further
supports this possibility. Participants who evaluated more than one African-American
target reported more suspicion and disbelief that they would be meeting anyone at the end
of the study. Overall, participants routinely commented about the situation seeming odd to
them. In particular, evaluating African-American targets made participants feel suspicious.
Participant suspicion could have led to hyper-vigilant attention to trait information
regardless of role or information treatments.
Given the failure of this study to replicate the Study 1 attention effects, and the
possibility that the target race manipulation may be to blame, further study
seems
warranted to respond to these problems. In particular, it seems
essential to return to target
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gender, as in Study 1, as the focus for measuring stereotype effects; this should reduce
participant discomfort with the experimental context and reduce suspicion
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Table 3.1
Study 2: Counterbalancing of Target Role and Target Race Manipulations
Distributor
Target Role
Receiver Observer
Condition Powerful Powerless Power-Irrelevant
1 White White White
2 White White Black
3 White Black White
4 Black White White
5 White Black Black
6 Black Black White
7 Black White Black
8 Black Black Black
Target race was counterbalanced across power roles in a between-subjects design.
Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of these eight conditions.
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Table 3.2
Study 2: Attention Data MANOVA Results
Within-subjects Analysis
Effect df F MSerror
Role 2 1.11 1.79a
Trait Consistency 1 2.95 1.94b
Trait Valence 1 3.80* 1.1
5
b
Role x Consistency 2 1.02 1.65
a
Role x Valence 2 3.361** 1.26
a
Consistency x Valence 1 3.245 1.33
b
Role x Consistency x Valence 2 0.29 1.46
a
>=05
** _ _
p=.03
a df=l 50
b df=75
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Table 3.3
Study 2: Between-subjects Analysis of Attention to Trait Information
MEAN ATTENTION TO TRAIT INFORMATION
Powerless
Receiver
Target Power Role
Power-Irrelevant Powerful
Observer Distributor
Trait
Stereotype
White
Black
Trait
Valence
Positive Negative
3.80 5.17
3.98 3.72
Trait
Valence
Positive Negative
4.15 4.51
3.74 4.68
Trait
Valence
Positive Negative
3.40 3.60
3.75 3.87
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Table 3.4
Study 2: Summary of Debriefing Response Data
Item Mean sd
How useful was the information you received about the
members of your group7
2.34 0.62
How certain are you ofyour responses today? 1.81 0.59
How accurate were your responses today? 2.53 0.81
How responsible do you feel for the evaluations you
made of the other group members?
2.22 0.83
Seventy-six participants responded to each of the four items using a scale of
1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3
Overview
In Study 3, the basic paradigm implemented in Studies 1 and 2 was redesigned to
address the unanticipated problems that emerged in Study 2. Major changes included
switching to a between-subjects analysis of target role, the addition of a brief interaction
between participants (who had been recruited in dyads), the manipulation of target gender
as salient social category information, and additional measures of motivation and
confidence. These changes are described in detail in the following sections.
Design
Independent Variables
Power Role
Target power role was operationalized as in the previous two studies, with
powerful targets controlling participant chances to win a prize via task assignments and
powerless targets contingent on the powerful for their own task assignments.
Once again,
power-irrelevant observer targets neither controlled participants’ outcomes
nor were
contingent on participants. As in the previous studies, participants
were led to believe that
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they would meet three other participants for a series of task assignment interactions at the
end of the study. In contrast, however, the present study manipulated power role as a
between-subjects factor. Participants were randomly assigned to receive trait information
about one target only. Target role labels—task distributor, task receiver, and observer-
remained the same as in Study 2.
Target Group Membership
Given the problems with manipulating race in Study 2, gender was chosen as the
salient target social category for the present study. In contrast to Study 1, however, target
gender was not manipulated in the present study. In that study, target gender was
manipulated within subjects, but information was collapsed across target gender to
examine trait stereotype-consistency effects. Given the lack of significant effects for
participant or target gender in Study 1
,
and the low availability of male participants in the
sample population of psychology students, it was empirically and practically reasonable to
limit participant and target gender to females only. Thus, trait stereotype-consistency will
be confounded with trait gender-stereotypicality in the present study.
Target gender was made salient in the present study using the same methods as the
previous two studies. First, gender relevant codenames were provided on the target profile
screens (Lace or Orchid). Second, a line indicating target gender was placed on the
profile
screen, as before.
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Trait Information
The gender traits implemented in Study 1 were unusable in the present study
because these traits had been selected based on the responses of French-speaking Belgian
students. A new set of gender stereotypic traits was pretested on the population of
American students from which the experimental sample was to be drawn. The procedure
for trait development followed that of Study 2, with a two-stage pretesting. In Stage 1
,
twenty male and female college students responded to open-ended questions asking them
to list as many stereotypes for men and women as possible. One-hundred-eighty traits
were selected from these free-response protocols. The stereotypicality of each of these
traits was tested on a second sample of 28 female students. A separate sample of 20
female students rated each trait for valence.
Eight traits were selected as target stimuli on the basis of these pretest ratings. As
in the previous studies, only traits that tested as uniquely descriptive of each group were
included in the final set of traits (Appendix E). Trait valence and trait stereotype-
consistency were crossed and randomized as in the previous studies such that target
information was half positive, and half negative, as well as half consistent with female
gender stereotypes, and half inconsistent.
In addition to these eight gender-stereotypic traits, two gender-irrelevant traits
(fun, dishonest) were included in the final trait set. Extensive pilot testing suggested
that
the novelty of the computer task artificially increased attention to the
first two traits. The
two gender-neutral items were added as the first two traits presented
for every target.
Presentation of the eight gender-relevant traits was randomized as
in the previous studies.
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Dependent Variables
Attention to trait information and pen-and-paper impression ratings constitute the
primary dependent variables in this study. In addition, measures of impression confidence
and impression motives were included.
Pre-test/Post-test Impression and Confidence Ratings
In contrast to the previous two studies, participants were recruited in dyads with
the intention of having pairs of participants interact briefly after receiving alleged target
information. Debriefing data from the previous studies suggested that participants
refrained from judging targets in anticipation of the alleged meeting. The addition of a
brief interaction between participants was intended to increase participants’ perceived
ability to judge.
Impression rating items were developed based on results of the trait pretesting
described above. Items were presented in the same pen-and-paper format as Study 2, with
participants marking an x on a line to indicate their responses. The final questionnaire
consisted of 14 trait ratings: 8 ratings were gender stereotypic, 5 were gender neutral and
1 item asked how much participants looked forward to meeting the target (Appendix F).
Immediately following each trait rating, participants were asked to indicate how
confident they were in that particular response. As with the impression ratings,
participants responded to these confidence measures by marking an x on a
line; the
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endpoints of the lines for these ratings were anchored by the phrases “not at all confident”
and “very confident”.
Participant impression and confidence ratings were collected both prior to and
immediately after the interaction period. The post-interaction questionnaire included one
additional item to assess how much participants believed their partners dominated the
interaction.
Motivation Ratings
Just prior to debriefing, participants completed a short questionnaire that asked
them to think about what they had been doing during the computerized portion of the
study. This self-report motivation measure consisted of 12 statements (Appendix G).
Participants were instructed to read each statement and to indicate how much each one
reflected what was on their minds while they were reading about the target on the
computer. Participants responded to each item using a scale of 1 (not at all on my mind) to
10 (very much on my mind). The items were created to reflect different impression
motives: motives to form accurate impressions and motives to stereotype. Items designed
to measure accuracy motives emphasized gathering new information (e.g., I was trying to
learn new information that might change my impressions of this person ”) and concern
over controlling one’s own outcomes (e g., “I was wondering what I could do to
influence
this person.”). In contrast, items designed to measure motives to stereotype
emphasized
confirmation of target expectations (“I was trying to match the information
with a picture
of the person in my head ”).
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Hypotheses
Attention Strategies and Impression Ratings
With regard to attention, the hypotheses were the same as in the previous two
studies. Target role was predicted to influence overall attention such that participants
would ignore the power-irrelevant observer target, paying less attention overall to this
target, compared to distributors or receivers. An interaction between power role and
stereotype-consistency of the trait information was predicted, as before. Participants
evaluating the powerful task distributor were predicted to individuate, paying increased
attention to gender stereotype-inconsistent information relative to perceivers evaluating
the other two targets. In contrast, participants were expected to stereotype powerless
receiver targets by default, and by design.
Predictions for target impression ratings were the same as the previous two studies
as well, but the effects were predicted to be stronger in the post-interaction ratings. A
main effect for time of rating (pre vs. post interaction) was predicted. Post-interaction
ratings of observers were predicted to be least variable and least stereotypic as participants
were not predicted to feel particularly able to judge these power-irrelevant targets. In
contrast, participants were expected to show a positivity bias when rating powerful
distributors. Finally, ratings of powerless receivers were predicted to be most
variable and
most gender stereotypic.
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Confidence Ratings. Judgeability
Individual confidence measures for each of the trait ratings were included as a
means of capturing perceiver judgeability. A main effect was predicted for time of measure
(pre-interaction v. post-interaction) with perceivers feeling overall more confident after
interacting with alleged targets. In addition, overall confidence in ratings was predicted to
vary as a function of target power role. Perceivers should feel most entitled to judge and
therefore be most confident when rating powerless receivers. Confidence was expected to
be lowest when participants evaluated power-irrelevant observer targets; the predicted
inattention to information about these targets should reduce feelings ofjudgeability.
Confidence ratings for perceivers evaluating powerful distributors were predicted to fall
between the other two target roles. Because participants should attend to distributors
more than observers, perceivers should feel more confident to judge distributors than
observers. Yet the powerless should still feel less confident than the powerful who were
predicted to feel especially entitled to judge.
Impression Motives
*
Research to date has not explored the self-reported impression motives
of people
in power relationships. The motivation measures included in this study
were necessarily
exploratory. However, because the items were intentionally
designed to reflect distinct
motives, and because the power role manipulations were
predicted to influence impression
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motives, factor analysis should extract separate orthogonal factors reflecting underlying
motives to form accurate impressions vs. motives to stereotype.
Method
Participants
Forty-five individual participants were recruited in dyads to participate in a study
of working groups. Of these, one participant was dropped from analyses because the dyad
partner failed to show up for the scheduled appointment. Of the remaining 44 participants,
2 dyads (4 participants) were dropped because one member of the dyad appeared to have
extreme attention measures (see discussion of outlier selection below). The final data set
included 40 participants in 20 dyads.
Procedure
Overall, the general instructions were the same as the previous two studies.
The
major procedural differences in this study were: 1) participants evaluated only one
target
in one role, and 2) participants in each dyad interacted for a
period of five minutes before
completing post-interaction impression ratings. The two participants
were separated from
the onset of the study and completed the computerized
portion of the study in adjoining
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labs. Two female experimenters led the individual participants through an overview of the
procedures before the computerized tasks.
It is important to note that although participants rated only one target, the
instructions were the same as the previous two studies. Participants still believed they
would be meeting three targets, one in each of the three power roles After receiving trait
information about the first target, participants completed the pre-interaction impression
ratings. At this point, the computer instructed participants to knock on the door and tell
the experimenter that they were ready for their first meeting.
The participant interactions (meetings) were randomly assigned to take place in
one oftwo adjoining lab rooms. Participants believed they were meeting the person they
had just learned about on the computer, so experimenters introduced each participant by
target codename and role. One experimenter was randomly assigned to lead the
instructions for the meeting. The other experimenter excused herself, indicating that she
needed to check on the other two alleged participants. The experimenter who remained
behind handed each participant a list of eight different work tasks (e g., enter information
into a database) that were labeled with regard to difficulty (easy v. challenging) and
general appeal (fun v. boring). The experimenter then explained that participants should
use the meeting to discuss the tasks on the lists; distributors were instructed not to make
task assignments during the meeting. Once participants understood the instructions, the
experimenter left the lab, closing the door behind her. Both experimenters returned after a
period of five minutes and participants returned to their original lab rooms
to complete
post-interaction impression ratings.
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When participants finished with impression ratings, they were instructed to
continue following the instructions on the computer screen At this point, the computer
was programmed to appear to have “crashed.” In reality, the program was designed to
require a complex key-entry to proceed, giving participants the illusion that the keyboard
had frozen. Participants responded to the problem as intended, knocking on the door to
get the experimenter’s attention.
The computer crash was designed as a cover explanation for ending the experiment
without having participants meet two additional targets. The rationale for this deception
was to try to maintain the same motivational context (a group meeting with participants
occupying different roles) in a between-subjects design. Recall that participants believed
they would meet three other participants before the end of the study. The elaborate
computer crash deception was employed to collect additional measures without having
these meetings .
1
When the experimenter entered the room after the alleged crash, she made an
ostensible attempt to restore the computer, shut off the computer screen, and left the room
(allegedly to discuss the problem with the other experimenter). Upon returning, she
indicated that the computer crash would make it impossible to continue the experiment as
planned. Participants were asked to complete the motivation questionnaire and a final
measure to assess suspicion before debriefing.
1 Although participants reported a great deal of suspicion regarding the
feigned crash during the
debriefing, all participants indicated that they really believed the
computer had frozen In fact, one
participant who indicated she was a computer science major reported trying to
fix the problem before she
knocked on the door for the experimenter.
81
Participants were carefully debriefed as to the true nature of the study
Experimenters made a special effort to explain the nature and origin of the trait ratings,
i.e., that it did not reflect any responses made by the other participant. To emphasize this
point, participants were informed that the other participant in the dyad received the same
information. When participants understood the procedures and goals of the study, they
were given experimental course credit and dismissed.
Results
Attention to Trait Information
Outlier Selection
Attention to trait information was recorded by the computer and converted into
attention scores as in the previous studies. Aggregate attention scores (stereotype-
consistency x valence) were calculated once again based on mean attention to two traits.
A new method was employed for identifying and excluding outlier attention data in
this study. Of the forty-four participants in complete dyads, four participants were
identified as having one or more aggregate scores greater than 2.5 standard deviations
above the mean. For three of these participants, the extreme aggregate scores were due to
increased attention to only one trait; attention to one trait was within the
normal
distribution of aggregate scores. Rather than drop these three participants,
losing data for
three dyads, these problem aggregate scores were re-calculated on the
basis of attention to
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one trait. The fourth participant with extremely high attention scores had three aggregate
scores 2.5 standard deviations above the mean. Closer inspection of that individual’s
responses suggested that substituting a single attention response for the aggregate scores
would not resolve the extremity problem. Data for this person’s dyad were dropped from
further analyses. In addition, data for one participant were identified as abnormally low
(i.e., faster) on all four attention scores. This person was presumed to have raced through
the computer tasks, data from that participant’s dyad were also dropped from analyses
After completing this outlier selection process, data for forty intact dyads remained.
Between-subiects Analysis
Aggregate attention scores were submitted to a mixed-design MANOVA with
target power role as a between-subjects factor, and trait stereotype-consistency and
valence were treated as within-subjects factors. The analysis failed to reveal any significant
treatment effects.
In light of these null effects, further inspection of the means is warranted to
determine possible explanations for the failed target role manipulations. Means for the
hypothesized interaction between target role and trait stereotype-consistency are presented
in Figure 4.1. The overall pattern suggests that the power role manipulations had
unplanned effects on participant impression strategies. First, the pattern of attention to
stereotype-consistent information does not support the hypothesis that powerful
perceivers would stereotype receivers by design. On the contrary, attention to stereotype-
consistent information was lowest when participants evaluated receivers and
observers,
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highest when evaluating distributors. This pattern also contradicts the hypothesis that
perceivers would individuate distributors who controlled outcomes.
Attention to stereotype-inconsistent information revealed another discouraging
pattern of means. Participants were predicted to ignore power-irrelevant observer targets,
as they did in Study 1
. Instead, perceivers paid the most attention to stereotype-
inconsistent information when they evaluated observers and distributors. The overall
pattern suggests participants were individuating observers, ignoring receivers, and
attending to everything about distributors. These results urge caution in interpreting any
effects of the target role manipulation that emerge in subsequent analyses.
Impression Ratings
Target impression ratings were scored as in Study 2, reverse-scoring negative
items. The resulting scores ranged from 0 to 5. Mean composite ratings were then
calculated based on the pretested gender-stereotypicality and valence of the ratings. This
procedure resulted in six composite impression ratings (gender x valence), female/positive,
female/negative, male/positive, male/negative, and gender-irrelevant/positive, gender-
irrelevant/negative
.
Gender-Relevant Ratings
Gender-relevant impression ratings were submitted to mixed-design
MANOVA,
with target power role as a between-subjects factor, and
rating gender (female, male).
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valence (positive v. negative), and time (pre- v. post-interaction) as within-subjects
factors. Because negative items were reverse-scored, ratings on these items should be
interpreted as less negative.
The analysis revealed main effects for the gender of the rating (FU5=\2 01,
p=.00\) as well as the valence (Fj
t
35=1 7.71,/?=. 000). Regardless of target power role,
participants rated targets as more masculine (M=3.47) than feminine (A/=3.28). The
valence effect indicates more extreme ratings on negative (M=3.80) rather than positive
(M=2.94) items. Due to the reverse scoring of these negative items, however, this pattern
can be interpreted as participant reluctance to evaluate targets negatively. The significant
two-way interaction between gender and valence (F/,3^1 1.22, p=.002) further supports
this possibility (Figure 4.2). Positive and negative feminine traits were statistically
equivalent, whereas masculine trait ratings diverged by valence. Again, the reverse scoring
of negative items indicates a reaction against rating targets negatively on masculine
dimensions.
In addition to these effects, the three-way interaction between target role, rating
gender, and valence was also significant, F2 ,3s=3.21, p—.05 (Table 4.1). In light of the null
effects for target role on the attention data, this interaction is difficult to
interpret.
Gender-Irrelevant Ratings
Analysis of the gender-irrelevant impression ratings revealed only a
significant
main effect for the valence of these ratings (FI, 35= 17. 19,/?=. 000). As
with the gender-
relevant ratings, participants made more extreme ratings on negative
(M=4.10) rather than
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positive (AY 3.10) items. This difference, once again, suggests participant reaction against
making negative target ratings.
Confidence Ratings
Confidence ratings for each individual trait rating were scored as the impression
ratings, and ranged from 1 to 5. Higher scores reflect more confidence in a given
impression rating. Composite scores for each type of trait rating were computed as with
the impression ratings, resulting in two sets (pre- and post-interaction) of six scores
(gender x valence): female/positive, female/negative, male/positive, male/negative, gender-
irrelevant/positive, and gender-irrelevant/negative.
Gender-Relevant Confidence Ratings
The confidence ratings for gender-relevant trait ratings were submitted to a mixed-
design MANOVA, with target power role between-subjects, gender and valence of the
ratings were treated as within-subjects factors, as was time of measurement (pre- v. post-
interaction). The analysis revealed effects similar to those of the impression rating data.
The hypothesis that participants would feel more confident after interacting with alleged
targets was not supported; the main effect for time of measurement was not significant.
A significant main effect for confidence as a function of the gender stereotypicality
of the ratings (Fi,35= 12. 51, ^=.001) paralleled the impression data and implied judgment
confidence was positively related to impression ratings. Participants felt
most confident
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rating targets on masculine (M=3.21) as compared to feminine (M=2
.87) dimensions The
two-way interaction between rating gender and valence qualified this effect (FUf=4.10,
P= °5) Participants were more confident rating targets in masculine/negative dimensions,
least confident rating feminine/positive dimensions. In light of participants’ unwillingness
to rate targets negatively, these data further support the possibility that participants
reacted against making negative target judgments.
Gender-Irrelevant Confidence Items
A comparable analysis of participant confidence for rating targets on gender-
irrelevant dimensions revealed a single main effect for rating valence (FU4= 14.55,
/?=001). Participants were more confident when rating participants on negative (M=3.37)
rather than positive (A/=2.29) gender-neutral dimensions. This effect also parallels the
impression ratings on gender-neutral items.
Summary
The impression ratings and confidence ratings together suggest that participants
were simply unwilling to make negative ratings, and they felt extremely confident in
asserting these ratings. The overall lack of mean differences as a function of target power
role is not surprising in light of the null effects for the attention data.
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Self-Reported Impression Motives
Factor Analysis
The 12 self-report motivation items were submitted to an exploratory principal
components factor analysis, using varimax rotation of factor loadings. The analysis
extracted four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Despite the extraction of four,
rather than two factors, the rotated factor loadings (Table 4.2) generally fit the predicted
clustering of items by impression motives. Items loading on the first factor suggest
motivated stereotype-maintenance: trying to see ifmy expectations were true, interested
in learning about this person, trying to match the information with a picture in my head.
In contrast, items loading on Factor 2 reflect motives to form accurate impressions: trying
to learn novel information, balance the good with the bad, make afair evaluation, and
gather as much information as possible. Factor 3 item loadings indicate participant
concerns over self-presentation: wondering what the other person thinks of me, worried
what others think ofme, and not concerned with being rational. This last item, concern
with being rational, was negatively related to the factor, indicating that participants
reported more concern about what others were thinking when they also reported feeling
concerned about being rational. This factor was therefore interpreted as a measure of
social anxiety. Finally, a fourth factor was defined by participant motives to get through
the information quickly. A second item, wondering what to do to influence the
interaction, loaded negatively on this factor. Thus, people who reported feeling least
motivated to rush through the materials also reported feeling most
concerned over
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influencing the target during the interaction Taken together, these factor loadings can be
interpreted as participant concern with controlling outcomes during the interaction
Motive Scale Score Analyses
Scale scores reflecting each of the four motivation factors were calculated based
on the rotated factor loadings, items that loaded negatively were weighted negatively in
these scale scores. The resulting motive scale scores for each factor were labeled as
motivated stereotyping, accuracy motives, social anxiety, and outcome control,
respectively.
Participant motive scores were submitted to independent ANOVAs with target
role as a between-subjects factor. These four analyses revealed only one significant
difference for outcome-control motives (F2
,
37=3. 75,/?=. 03). Recall that the item
wondering what to do to influence the interaction was negatively weighted on this factor
Thus, negative scores can be interpreted as stronger motivations to control outcomes
during the interaction. As would be predicted on the basis of outcome contingency,
participants evaluating powerful distributors reported higher outcome-control motives
(M=-3.09), compared to participants evaluating powerless receivers (M=. 50), and
participants evaluating power-irrelevant observers (M=. 54), f2«=-3.58,p=.05, and t23=-
3.62, p=. 09. Although these motives are consistent with the role manipulations,
they are
not consistent with the attention data and the failed role manipulations.
For these reasons,
this significant effect should be interpreted with caution.
89
Discussion
The Bad News
Once again, the present study failed to replicate the results of Study 1 . Analysis of
the attention data revealed no support for the hypothesized relationship between power
roles and impression strategies. The power role manipulations appear to have had the
unintended effect of making people worry about what observer targets were thinking of
them and ignoring receivers.
In hindsight, it is quite possible that participants in the present study interpreted the
observer role label to mean that these participants would be evaluating as well as
observing their interactions. If so, participants may have felt particularly motivated to form
accurate evaluations of observers. Anecdotal debriefing data support this explanation.
Participants reported feeling generally suspicious of the two-way mirrors in the lab rooms,
even though these mirrors were completely covered with dark paper. Several participants
also reported feeling watched or video-taped during the study. If the dynamics of the room
made participants feel scrutinized, it may have had the unintended effect of also making
participants feel somewhat accountable, and hence participants may have adopted
accuracy motives regardless of target power role.
The overall complexity of the study is an additional potential problem that could
explain the ineffective role manipulations. The computerized instructions were quite
lengthy and complicated. Some participants reported feeling confused about
the roles.
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Moreover, the role labels (distributor, etc.) were chosen to reduce confounding control
with status, but they may have inadvertently confused participants instead These problems
are addressed in Study 4 with a modified design and new role labels.
The Good News
Despite the problems with the role manipulations, the impression motive measures
may prove useful. The factor structure for these responses was meaningfully interpretable
in terms of the hypothesized impression motives. However, because of the small sample
size, relative to the number of motive items, the factor structure should be replicated on an
additional sample to ensure its stability. The items will be retained in Study 4 to verify the
factor structure.
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Figure
4.2.
Study
3:
Impression
rating
analysis.
Rating
stereotypicality
x
rating
valence
interaction
Table 4.1
Study 3: Gender-Relevant Impression Ratings
Target Power Role x Gender Stereotype x Valence Interaction
MEAN IMPRESSION RATINGS
Tareet Power Role
Powerless Power-Irrelevant Powerful
Receiver Observer Distributor
Gender
Stereotype
Female
Male
Trait
Valence
Positive Negative
2.91 3.56
3.12 3.70
Trait
Valence
Positive Negative
3.07 3.12
2.67 4.20
Trait
Valence
Positive Negative
3.11 3.81
2.72 4.38
Note: Negative items were reverse-scored. Higher scores on negatively-valenced
dimensions should be interpreted as less negative ratings.
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Table 4.2
Item
Factor
Statistics
Study 3: Impression Motive Factor Analysis
Motivated Accuracy Social Outcome
Stereotyping Motives Anxiety Control
see ifexpectations are true .832
interested in learning about
others
.812
match information with
picture in my head
.794
learn novel information .761
balance the good with the bad .741
makefair evaluations .600
gather as much information as
possible
.584
wonder what the person thinks
ofme
.706
worried others think positive
ofme
.648
unconcerned with being
rational
-.632
get through the information .908
quickly
thinking what I could do to
influence this person
-.518
eigenvalue 4.12 1.43 1.23 1.13
cumulative % variance
explained
34.3 46.3 56.6 66.1
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 4
Overview
Given the problems with Studies 2 and 3, the present study required significant
redesign. Building on the between-subjects design used in Study 3, the overall complexity
of the study was reduced in hopes of improving the power manipulations. Once again, the
primary objective was to replicate attention effects found in Study 1 . In addition, the
present study included the confidence and impression motive measures introduced in
Study 3. Detailed explanations of design changes are described below.
Design
Independent Variables
Power Role
The design of the study was similar to that of Study 3, involving a between-
subjects manipulation of power roles. As in Study 3, participants were recruited in
dyads
but led to believe that additional people were present for the study.
This time, participants
believed there were two, rather than three, other participants
in the study.
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Two changes were made to improve the power role manipulations First, the labels
for the different power roles were changed to manager (powerful), employee (powerless),
and alternate (power-irrelevant). These familiar terms were more relevant to the
experimental context (working groups) and should clarify the nature of the outcome-
relationships between participants.
Second, participants were assigned to a single power role when they arrived at the
lab. In the previous studies, participants believed they would occupy all three roles at
some time during the study. Here, participants believed they had been assigned a single
role that remained constant throughout the study. This change was intended to further
simplify the general complexity of the study, making it easier for participants to
understand their own roles in relation to targets. Within dyads, power roles were randomly
assigned in an incomplete crossing of the three roles; participants in the same dyad never
occupied the same roles (i.e., managers never evaluated managers, etc ). This design
constraint resulted in three dyad role combinations: manager/employee, manager/altemate,
and employee/altemate. Role combination served as a perceiver and target variable in this
design.
As in the previous studies, powerful managers were given the role of assigning a
task to powerless employees, whose outcomes-were contingent on receiving a good task
assignment. In contrast to the prior studies, the role of the power-irrelevant alternate was
redefined. Participants believed that alternates were recruited as back-up participants
in
the event a manager or employee did not show up for the study. Participants
were further
told that since everyone had allegedly arrived for the study, alternates
would simply
97
participate in the same procedures as managers and employees, but only for the purpose of
piloting separate materials for a future study.
Target Group Membership and Trait Information
Gender was again chosen as the salient target category. As in Study 3, target and
participant gender were limited to females only. Target gender was made salient via
codenames and gender identification on target profile screens, just as in the previous
study.
The gender-stereotypic trait stimuli pretested for Study 3 were also used in the
present study, with the exception of two traits. Further trait testing suggested that two
male traits (one positive, one negative) may have had undue influence on participant
attention. The traits self-assured and intolerant were substituted in the present study for
the two problem traits, likes being single and braggart. Otherwise, the presentation of
trait information was exactly as in Study 3 . The two filler traits (fun, dishonest) were
followed by the randomly presented gender-stereotypic traits.
Dependent Variables
Impression. Confidence, and Motivation Ratings
Participants in the present study rated targets on the same dimensions as Study 3,
rating confidence in each trait rating as before. This time, however,
participants were
asked to respond to the impression motive questionnaire before
answering the impression
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rating questions. The impression motive items were attached as a separate page to the
front of the impression questionnaire. Participants responded to the motive and impression
questionnaires pre- and post-interaction.
Hypotheses
The general hypotheses were exactly the same as the previous studies. However,
the nature of the incomplete design warrants clarification of how the hypotheses will be
tested in the present study.
Participants occupy all three roles as perceivers and targets. However, the
reactions of alternate perceivers are not of interest to the present analysis.
1 What is of
interest here is how powerful and powerless perceivers attend to one another and how
they each attend to targets in the baseline alternate roles. Alternate perceivers were
included in the design only so that power-relevant perceivers could meet them to interact
in the present study. The data for alternate perceivers will be excluded for the attention
analyses.
2
Perceiver x target power role combinations will be identified as a single variable
for omnibus mixed-design MANOVAs using role combination as a between-subjects
factor. In addition, planned contrasts will test the hypotheses that: 1) employees
1 Moreover, the general motivations of alternate participants are difficult to predict.
On the one hand,
alternates may be unmotivated to participate in the study because of their extraneous roles.
On the other
hand, these participants may become motivated to help the experimenter pilot the
materials.
2
Attention data for these participants are summarized in Appendix H. For the
impression and motive
ratings, alternates’ responses were retained in these respective
analyses for two reasons: 1) to calculate
meaningful error terms for the post-interaction impression ratings, and 2) to
maintain a large enough
sample for factor analyzing the motivation items.
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individuated managers, 2) managers stereotyped employees by default, and 3) managers
stereotyped employees by design.
The first two contrasts compare perceiver attention to stereotype-inconsistent
information as a function of perceiver and target power First, employees evaluating
managers are predicted to pay significantly more attention to stereotype-inconsistent
information relative to perceivers in the other perceiver/target role combinations. This
would support the hypothesis that powerless employees are motivated to individuate
powerful managers. Second, for perceivers in the remaining three role combinations,
including managers evaluating employees, no statistical difference is predicted between
groups with regard to attention to stereotype-inconsistent information. This would
support the prediction that managers would stereotype employees by default, ignoring
stereotype-inconsistent information relative to employees evaluating managers.
The final contrast compares attention to stereotype-consistent information as a
function of perceiver and target power. Managers evaluating employees are predicted to
pay significantly more attention to stereotype-consistent information relative to perceivers
in the remaining role combinations. A significant result would support the hypothesis that
managers stereotype employees by design, effortfully attending to stereotype-consistent
information.
Similar procedures, omnibus F tests followed by planned comparisons, were
planned to test hypotheses regarding the effects of perceiver and target
power on
impression ratings and judgment confidence. As in the previous studies, perceiver/target
power roles were predicted to influence impression ratings,
with powerful managers
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making more confident, more variable, and more stereotypic ratings of powerless
employees, compared to perceivers in other role combinations.
With regard to the impression motives, the goal of the present study was to
replicate the factor structure produced in Study 3 and to further explore the predicted
relations between these motives and power.
Method
Participants
One-hundred-thirty-five female undergraduates participated in a study of working
groups in exchange for optional course credit. Data for 24 participants were excluded: 5
participants were dropped because of participant error (2 failed role manipulation checks,
2 did not understand how to use the impression questionnaires, and 1 person refused to
complete the written materials); 1 1 participants were dropped because of concerns over
participant characteristics (4 participants recognized one another during the study, 4
participants were in mixed-race dyads, and 3 participants were physically ill), and finally, 8
participants were either suspicious about the number of people present (3 participants) or
the goals of the study (5 participants). Of the remaining 109 participants, eight were
dropped due to outlier attention data (see below). These outlier selection
procedures left a
total of 101 participants in the final sample.
3
3 The participants excluded from analysis based on suspicion or
experimental issues were randomly
distributed among the different power roles, X
2
5=6.63, p=.27.
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Procedure
Participants were recruited in dyads but met individually by one of two female
experimenters. Participants were escorted to separate adjoining labs so they would not
meet or interact prior to the meeting planned for the latter part of the study. The two
female experimenters led participants through the preliminary portions of the study
individually.
Dyads were randomly assigned to power role combinations. Within dyads,
participants were randomly assigned to roles. Experimenters began by giving a brief
overview of the study and explaining the basic relationships between participants in
different power roles. Experimenters further explained that three participants had allegedly
arrived for the study, and that each one of them would be assigned to one of the three
roles: manager, employee, or alternate. Once participants were assigned to their own
roles, it was further emphasized that alternates were in no way influential in assigning
tasks, nor would they compete against employees for a prize. Although alternate
participants would participate in the same procedures as managers and employees,
including a brief meeting to discuss tasks, alternates remained in the study only to pilot
test materials for a future study.
Participants then completed the computerized portion of the study, receiving trait
information that was alleged to be true of another participant in a different role, and
then
completing the motivation and impression ratings with regard to that target.
At this point,
the computer instructed participants to knock on the door and indicate
they were ready to
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have their first meeting. As in the previous study, the meeting took place in a randomly
assigned lab and one participant moved to the other participant’s lab The remaining
procedures for the meeting were the same as Study 3, except that the interaction period
was shortened to 3 V2 minutes, rather than 5. When the meeting ended, participants were
separated to complete the post-interaction motivation and impression ratings
At this point, the procedures diverged from the computer-crash deception
employed in Study 3
. The experimenter ended the present study by explaining that it was
sometimes difficult to complete all of the meetings when three participants were present
for the study, and due to the lab schedule, it was necessary to end the study without
completing the remaining meetings. Participants completed a final questionnaire to assess
suspicion before they were debriefed.
Results
Attention to Trait Information
Outlier Selection
Data for 1 09 participants were examined for outliers on attention to trait
information using the same methods as Study 3 . The distributions for attention to
individual trait items were visually inspected; any individual attention score greater than or
equal to 7 seconds was identified as an outlier.
4 Of the 109 participants, 25 had one or
4
This selection procedure is different from the one used in the previous three studies.
In those studies,
the cut-off points were set as values greater than 2.5 standard deviations
above the mean. This procedure
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more attention scores that met these criteria Aggregate attention scores (stereotype-
consistency x valence) for 1 7 of these participants could be retained using attention to a
single trait, as in the previous study. Data for eight of these participants contained too
many extreme scores to salvage their aggregate scores, so data for these participants were
excluded from further analysis. Aggregate scores for the remaining 101 participants were
based on mean attention to two traits, as in previous studies.
Attention Analyses
The present study used an incomplete factorial design, participants never rated
targets in their own power roles. Testing the hypotheses required coding participant dyads
for perceiver/target role and testing means with planned contrasts. First, a six-level
variable was created to identify each of the possible perceiver/target power role
combinations, manager/employee, manager/altemate, employee/manager,
employee/altemate, altemate/manager, altemate/employee. Participants in these latter two
combinations (alternate perceivers) were excluded from the attention analyses. The four
aggregate attention scores (consistency x valence) for the remaining role combinations
were submitted to a mixed-design MANOVA with the role combination variable as a
between-subjects treatment, and stereotype-consistency and valence as repeated-
measures.
5
is problematic because one extreme outlier can unduly influence the values
of the standard deviations
scores below 2.5 sds may still be relatively extreme. This problem was solved
in the present analysis b\
visually inspecting the item distributions and looking for consistent breaks
in the distributions across
attention variables.
5 Comparable analyses including these participants revealed the same pattern
of eflects.
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The hypothesized interaction between power-role combination and stereotype
consistency did not emerge. Instead, the analysis revealed main effects for power-role
combination {FUI=A.\ 1,/?=.04) and trait consistency (F,, 7I=\ 5.80, p= 000). Participants
in both power-relevant roles (manger and employee) paid relatively less attention to
power-irrelevant alternates (A^=3.78 andM=3.78, respectively), than to one another
There was no difference in the overall amount of attention that managers paid to
employees (M=4.32) as compared to employees attention to managers (M=4.51).
Regardless of role, however, participants paid significantly more attention to stereotype-
inconsistent (M=A.30) rather than stereotype-consistent (M=3.87) information.
A significant effect also emerged between trait consistency and valence,
Fiji=\ 3.93,/?=. 000. Participants paid the most attention to negatively valenced
stereotype-inconsistent information, regardless of power (Figure 5.1). This effect was not
hypothesized and suggests that participant attention was information, rather than role,
driven.
In addition to these effects, there was a marginal interaction between power role
combination and trait valence (/Y,7/=2.26, p-.09). The interaction is somewhat difficult to
interpret because the pattern of means support neither perceiver nor target role effects
(Figure 5.2). Managers appear to pay somewhat more attention to negative information
about employees, compared to managers evaluating alternates. Yet, employees show no
bias in favor of positive or negative information, regardless of target role.
Although the hypothesized interaction between power role combination and trait
consistency was not significant, it is nevertheless useful to examine the
relevant means
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(Figure 5.3). Planned comparisons revealed no evidence in support of the hypotheses.
Powerless employees paid no more attention to stereotype-inconsistent information about
managers than perceivers in the other power role dyads. This is not surprising in light of
the main effect for trait consistency, and the interaction between consistency and valence
Participants were interested in stereotype-inconsistent information regardless of
perceiver/target power role. The means for manager participants were equally
discouraging as they counter the hypothesized stereotyping mechanisms. The overall
pattern implies that the powerful were neither stereotyping by default nor by design
Impression and Confidence Ratings
One goal of the present study was to integrate participant impression ratings with
confidence ratings to create a measure ofjudgeability. Target impression and confidence
ratings were scored as before, negatively-valenced items were reverse-scored. These
ratings were submitted to independent analyses using the design employed on the attention
data. The analyses produced similar patterns of treatment effects for both measures,
allowing for the empirical integration of these two measures.
To create the measure ofjudgeability, participant impression ratings were
weighted by confidence ratings. Each individual impression rating was weighted by
multiplying the trait rating with the confidence rating. Note, because of the nature of these
weightings, higher ratings reflect more extreme confident ratings, whereas lower
ratings
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reflect less extreme low-confidence ratings Hence, overall, these ratings reflect participant
willingness to judge on a given dimension
Aggregate trait ratings (rating gender x valence) were calculated using these
weighted scores. The aggregate ratings were submitted to a mixed-design MANOVA with
power role combination as a between-subjects factor, and rating gender (female, male,
gender-neutral), valence (positive, negative) and time (pre-interaction, post-interaction) as
within-subjects factors. Power role combination had no significant effect on these
weighted target ratings. However, there were significant effects for type of information,
and these effects were qualified by higher order interactions with time of rating
Type of Rating
Main effects for valence and gender of the rating were both significant
(F/.67=26.03,p= 000, and F/, <57=5 1.32,/?=.000 respectively). Participants made more
extreme ratings on positive (M=9.95) rather than negative (M=7.95) dimensions, and on
gender-neutral (M= 11 .13) rather than feminine (M=7.57) or masculine (AF=8. 16)
dimensions.
These effects were qualified by an interaction between rating gender and valence
(F2,/3<=1 0.61,/?=.000). Participants were most willing to judge on gender-neutral
dimensions, regardless of rating valence (Figure 5.4). In contrast, participants were more
willing to judge on gender-relevant dimensions that were positive rather than negative, in
particular with regard to feminine trait ratings. This pattern of effects would suggest an
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overall positivity bias in participants’ willingness to judge, and a bias in favor of making
non-stereotypic judgments.
Time
Time of measurement also had significant effects on participant target ratings. As
predicted, participants felt more willing to judge after the interaction 9.34) as
compared to before (A/=8.56), Fi ^lA5, p=. 008. This main effect was qualified by
interactions with rating valence (FI, 67=5
.44, p=.02) and gender (F2, 754=9.1 44, p=. 000).
Once participants had the opportunity to meet the alleged target, they were more
willing to make negative judgments (Figure 5.5). Weighted judgment ratings increased for
the negative dimension post-interaction (M=8.51 vs. M=7.40). It is possible that positive
ratings remained the same over time due to a ceiling effect. With regard to gender,
participants made more extreme ratings on both feminine (M=8.45 vs. M=6.67) and
masculine (M=8.53 vs. M=7.75) dimensions after the interaction period (Figure 5.6). In
contrast, ratings on gender-neutral dimensions appear to have become less extreme after
the interaction (M- 10.79 vs. M= 1 1 .42).
Although the role manipulations failed to have the predicted effects on
judgeability, having participants meet alleged targets appears to have successfully boosted
perceived judgeability. Participants felt more able to judge in general after the meeting.
Importantly, participants were more willing to judge targets negatively and more gender-
stereotypically after they met, suggesting that the overall positivity of
ratings was a
function of their reluctance to judge.
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Impression Motives
Factor Analysis
Participants rated impression motives both before and after interaction, but the
ratings taken immediately after receiving trait information are the most valid reflection of
what participants were thinking while evaluating trait information. Only pre-interaction
ratings are considered for these analyses. The 12 motive items were submitted to principal
components factor analysis using varimax rotation of factor loadings, as in Study 3
.
The analysis extracted four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1
.0; the pattern of
factor loadings was very similar to that of Study 3 (Table 5.1). The major differences
between the two analyses appear to be the relative strengths of the extracted factors, and a
few item loadings switched factors. Accuracy-motives define the first factor and account
for the most variance explained in the present motivation data. In contrast, motivated-
stereotyping accounted for the most variance in Study 3 motives.
The pattern of loadings meaningfully replicated the previous study. Three items
switched factors, but these changes appear to influence only the interpretation of the
fourth factor. In the present analysis, the items loading on this factor are not meaningfully
interpretable. In fact, the nature of these items is contradictory, and one item split-loads on
the social-anxiety factor. The fact that some items did change factors alludes to instability
in the underlying factor structure. This instability could be attributed to a relatively
small
sample size, or the relatively small number of scale items, or both.
109
Factor Score Analyses
Because of the problem in interpreting the fourth factor, only the first three factors
were retained for further analysis. Factor scale scores were calculated as in the previous
study (mean scale scores) and submitted to MANOVA with power role combination as a
between-subjects factor. Unfortunately, there were no significant effects of role on
*»
impression motive scale scores. In a follow-up analysis, factor scores were generated
using the regression procedure in SPSS. These regression factor scores were submitted as
predictor variables in linear regression analyses to test the relationship between motives
and attention to trait information. These analyses also found no relationship between
motives and attention.
In summary, although the impression motives appear to have a reasonably reliable
factor structure, they do not appear to have any predictive validity in the present study.
Self-reported impression motives did not vary as a function of power role, nor did they
affect attention to trait information. Given the many problems with the manipulation of
power in these studies, however, these items could prove useful nevertheless in another
experimental context.
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Discussion
The Bad News, Again
Once again, the power manipulations had no effect on participant impression
strategies. Participants appear to have engaged in individuating attention strategies
regardless of participant or target power. There was no evidence of powerholder
stereotyping by default or by design. Despite the efforts to improve the procedure in the
present study, hindsight suggests additional problems with the present design that could
account for this failure. These issues are discussed in detail in the following chapter
A Little Good News
Perhaps the most useful data to emerge from the present study are participant
impression ratings. While the power role manipulations did not influence participant
judgments, meeting the alleged target appears to have bolstered judgeability. As predicted,
participants were more willing to judge after they met one another. The weighting method
employed in this study may prove useful for testing judgeability as a function of power in
future studies, should the effects of Study 1 be replicated.
Finally, analysis of the impression motives produced a similar factor structure to
that of Study 3. Although the motive scale scores did not correlate
with attention and
power in the present study, this is likely because of the failed power
manipulations.
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Table 5.1
Study 4: Impression Motive Factor Analysis
Accuracy Social Motivated Factor
Item
Motives Anxiety Stereotyping 4
makefair evaluations
.844
gather as much information
as possible
.779
interested in learning about
others
.645
concerned with being
rational
.565
balance the good with the
bad
.517
worried others think positive .869
ofme
wonder what the person .867
thinks ofme
thinking what 1 could do to
influence this person
.549
see ifexpectations are true .900
match information with
picture in my head
.593
get through the information .866
quickly
learn novel information .448
Factor eigenvalue 3.47 1.86 1.33 1.04
Statistics
cumulative % variance
explained
28.9 44.5 55.5 64.2
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CHAPTER 6
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Summary of Results
The goal of the present research was to explore the relationship between social
power and stereotyping. The general hypotheses were that powerless perceivers would be
motivated not to stereotype the powerful, and in turn would attend to information that
challenged their stereotypes, forming less stereotypic impressions. In contrast, powerful
perceivers were predicted to stereotype the powerless in two ways: by default (ignoring
stereotype inconsistent information) and by design (increasing attention to stereotype-
consistent information). As a result of these attention biases, the powerful were predicted
to form more stereotypic impressions. Moreover, due to their perceived entitlement to
make judgments, powerful perceivers were predicted to feel more confident to judge,
relative to powerless perceivers.
Aside from the attention data in Study 1, these hypotheses were not supported by
the present research. Study 1 provided evidence for the hypothesis that powerholders
stereotype by default and by design; participants evaluating powerless targets ignored
stereotype-inconsistent information and paid significantly more attention to stereotype-
consistent information relative to perceivers evaluating powerful or power-irrelevant
targets. Studies 2 through 4 failed to replicate these attention effects. On the contrary, the
data from these three studies suggest that people were motivated to individuate targets
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regardless of outcome-control or outcome-dependency. Across all three studies,
participants attended to inconsistent information, regardless of power role The results
contradict previous research on power and mutual interdependence and therefore call into
question the validity of the power manipulations.
With regard to impression ratings, the power manipulations again failed to produce
the intended effects. Across studies, participants responded with predominantly positive
target ratings, regardless of perceiver or target power. These results are not surprising in
light of the failed power manipulations. Furthermore, these results suggest that
participants may have felt accountable for their ratings, despite efforts to maintain
anonymity (e g., assigning participant codenames, etc ). The confidence measures
introduced in Study 3 further support the likelihood that participants felt uncomfortable
expressing negative or stereotypic target impressions.
Finally, the self-report motivation measures that were included in the last two
studies also failed to show any relationship to perceiver power relationships or attention to
trait information. Because these null effects could be attributed to the failed power
manipulations, they should not necessarily be dismissed in future studies.
Given the discouraging results of these studies, one could conclude that the Study
1 results were a statistical anomaly and the hypotheses are simply wrong. However, this
explanation would not account for prior research (described in the introduction) that
found evidence for stereotyping by design in a different paradigm. Moreover, the fact that
outcome-dependency had no effects in these studies seriously questions the
operationalization of the control and contingency manipulations.
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Participants in Studies 2-4 appear to be individuating, rather than simply ignoring
individuating information, regardless of power. This suggests that perceivers were
generally very motivated to attend. Yet, participants also were generally hesitant to
express stereotypic judgments. Together, this pattern of high attention and reluctance to
judge hint that participants may have felt accountable for their impressions When people
feel accountable, they tend to pay more attention in general and engage in individuated
impression strategies. Moreover, accountable perceivers typically refrain from making
stereotypic judgments (Tetlock, 1992).
Hindsight is 20/20
In retrospect, a number of methodological issues could account for the failure of
the power manipulations in the present studies, including sampling differences and
procedural differences.
Sampling Issues
Two important sampling differences could account for the differences in results
between Study 1 and the remaining studies. First, the sample used in Study 1 was drawn
from a population of college students enrolled in a European university. Studies 2-4 relied
on a similar sample of American students. There are important differences between these
two samples with regard to norms about research participation. For the Belgian students.
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research participation was a required course component, and departmental norms stressed
the importance of participation as a learning experience. In fact, these students must
participate in a minimum number of studies and be prepared to explain the basic goals of
the studies during oral examinations at the end of the academic term Consequently, these
participants were likely to be highly motivated to attend to the instructions and to be
involved more generally in the procedures. In comparison, research participation norms
for the American students are quite different. Participation is optional, and most students
participate to boost their grades, as opposed to doing so out of particular interest in the
studies. Moreover, students drawn from the American sample generally have more
suspicions about the experimenters’ motives and are generally more concerned with
impression management, as compared to their Belgian counterparts. These sample
differences could influence perceiver motives in important ways. Participants in the
American studies may have simply been so concerned about what the experimenters
thought of them that they felt more accountable than their Belgian counterparts (Study 1).
This explanation is, however, inconsistent with the fact that prior research found a
relationship between power and stereotyping using the same population of American
students, albeit using a different experimental paradigm. Hence the cultural differences
between samples cannot fully explain the problems in the failed studies.
A second sampling issue has to do with the use of only female participants (and
targets) in Studies 2-4. The decision to sample only female participants was a pragmatic
one and empirically justified by the lack of gender effects in the first study. However, the
lack of effects could have been a fluke in and of itself. It is possible that women are more
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likely to individuate than men. Person memory research suggests that women store social
information in categories based on individual persons whereas men store information in
social group categories (Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides, & Li, 1993). Although no prior
impression formation research has found such gender effects for attention, it is possible
that power relationships elicit different processing motives compared to previously
investigated relationships. Once again, however, this explanation is inconsistent with prior
research on power in which no gender differences have been found (Goodwin & Fiske,
1996a; Stevens & Fiske, 1996).
Procedural Issues
Procedural differences between Study 1 and Studies 2-4 provide more
parsimonious explanations for the failed power manipulations. In Study 1, participants
were recruited in large groups and were in sight of all potential group members, including
people who were potentially not in their alleged groups. In contrast, participants in Studies
2-4 were aware that only participants in their specific working group would be present.
Moreover, participants were isolated in individual labs for the computerized collection of
the attention data. These procedural differences amount to a fundamental difference
between intergroup (Study 1) and intragroup (Studies 2-4) contexts. For participants in
studies 2-4, the intragroup nature of the social context may have: 1) failed to activate
social group stereotypes and 2) induced accuracy motives.
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Stereotype Activation
Participants in the failed studies may not have stereotyped (i.e
,
may have
individuated) simply because the target social group of empirical interest was less salient,
if targets were not categorized by group (gender/race), relevant stereotypes may not have
been activated. In Study 1, participants knew from the start that there were men and
women in the study; they could see participants from both gender groups in the room. The
visual salience of gender group membership likely activated the stereotypes of empirical
interests in that study. In contrast, participants in the failed studies were isolated from
other group members, there were no visual cues to strengthen stereotype-activation in
these studies. Moreover, Studies 3 and 4 did not manipulate target gender, so there were
no contrasting target information cues in these stimuli to activate intergroup stereotypes.
It is possible that other group stereotypes were more salient to participants in the
failed studies. Anecdotal evidence of participant responses support this explanation. The
brief interaction periods in Studies 3 and 4 were audio-recorded and transcribed. Initial
inspection of these interactions suggest academic major was most relevant to participants
in the context of the study. Participants often remarked that certain tasks would be more
interesting to psychology majors, etc. The studies’ hypotheses rest on the assumption that
participants would stereotype targets along gender (or race. Study 2) dimensions. In
retrospect, the decision not to manipulate perceiver and target gender may have proven to
be a poor one, despite the lack of gender effects in Study 1
.
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Accuracy Motives
Even if gender/race stereotypes were activated, as intended, it is still possible that
procedural differences in the failed studies led these participants to feel more accountable
First, participants in Study 1 signed up for sessions voluntarily via recruiting lists in a
common area within the psychology department. Participants in the other studies were
recruited instead by telephone for two reasons: 1) to ensure that no participants had been
in a previous deception study and 2) to ensure a low no-show rate; the need to have dyads
present for the latter studies made it imperative that participants felt obligated to keep
their appointments. Unfortunately, these recruiting differences could have led participants
in the failed studies to feel particularly scrutinized, less anonymous, and generally more
accountable. Differences in experimental setting between the studies could further
exaggerate feelings of accountability. Study 1 participants may have felt more anonymous
in large groups, as compared to the participants in the failed studies who sat alone in
individual labs. Accountability increases accuracy motives and individuation. If
participants did feel generally accountable, it would explain the pattern of results in the
failed studies.
The intragroup context in the failed studies also could have led to accuracy
motives if, rather than identifying with the social groups of experimental interest
(e g., race, gender), participants identified with other participants as a “team
” In Study 1,
large groups of participants made it impossible for individual participants to visually
identify who belonged to their alleged groups. Thus, it was unlikely that participants in this
study found their membership in the upcoming work group to be a meaningful social
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identity. In contrast, participants in the remaining studies, lacking any salient intergroup
social information, may have identified with their specific working groups (i.e
,
the other
participants in the given session). That is, because social group membership—i.e.,
gender—was relatively less salient, membership as a participant in a working group may
have been more consequential to perceivers in these studies. If participants thought of
themselves as members of a particular working “team,” they also may have felt
interdependent, regardless of the power role manipulations. Identifying as team members,
participants might have been motivated to maximize team rewards; forming accurate
impressions of the other group members would increase prediction and control over the
group’s rewards. As stated, when people are interdependent, they individuate. Moreover,
studies of group interdependence find that people individuate members of their own
groups (Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). This explanation fits nicely with the data of the failed
studies.
Future Directions and Implications
The overarching conclusion to be drawn from the present studies is this: In
absence of an intergroup context, women do not stereotype other women as a function of
power role. These results, as stated, are inconsistent with the proposed hypotheses. Given
the results of the three failed studies, it is tempting to throw out the hypotheses with the
paradigm and conclude that powerful people do not stereotype their subordinates. Yet, the
potential problems described above, in particular the salience of intergroup versus
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intragroup relations urges prudence in dismissing the hypotheses. In light of these
r
procedural issues, the relationship between power and stereotyping remains an empirical
question. Importantly, these results imply that group context may moderate the
relationship between power and stereotyping found in previous studies.
Future research should test the possibility that intergroup settings lead the
powerful to stereotype, whereas intragroup settings encourage individuation. One obvious
way to determine whether or not the intragroup context influenced social identification
would be to simply replicate the lab setting of Study 1, manipulating the number of
participants present (one work group vs. three or more work groups). If the nature of the
context is responsible for the failed studies, one would predict no relationship between
power and stereotyping when only participants for one workgroup are present. In
contrast, when enough participants are available to create three or more groups, one
would predict power to increase stereotyping. Additional measures of group identification
could be included to further validate the role of intergroup contexts in moderating the
relationship between power and stereotyping.
Importantly, if intergroup contexts are responsible for stereotyping effects in
power relations, it would not bode well for diminishing the larger problem of stereotyping
and intergroup bias. As our culture becomes more and more diverse, intergroup contexts
are becoming a social reality in most decision-making scenarios. Consequently, unless
powerful perceivers can be motivated to attend to target characteristics other than social
group membership, the status quo in power relationships between groups is likely to
prevail. Conversely, if intragroup contexts reduce powerholders’ use of stereotypes, these
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contexts could provide an antidote to the deliterious effects of power on impression
formation. Consistent with recent arguments from social identity perspectives (e g
Brewer, 1996), finding ways to enhance intragroup indentifications in power relations
could encourage individuation. In light of these social ramifications, exploring the role of
group context in power and stereotyping is an important avenue for future research
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APPENDIX A
STUDY 1: TRAIT INFORMATION
Positive
Negative
Feminine
conscientious
sensible
affectionate
fine (appearance)
attentive of others
diplomatic
elegant
tender
emotional
jealous
anxious
demanding
wasteful
timid
complaining
capricious
Masculine
sure of oneself
active
direct
competitive
muscular
funny
ambitious
ironic
unfaithful
insensitive
brutal
authoritarian
too rational
lazy
greedy
feel invulnerable
Approximately 1 80 trait adjectives were pretested by asking participants to rate
how many of 100 men/women would likely be characterized by each trait. Difference
scores between ratings for the two genders were tested. Only traits that differed
significantly (p< 05) were considered. From this set, traits with the highest mean
differences between gender groups were chosen for the final set.
129
APPENDIX B
STUDY 1: IMPRESSION RATING ITEMS
The following items, translated from the original French, constituted the
impression rating measure for Study 1. Participants responded to each item using a 7-point
scale ranging from not at all” to “very”. Gender consistency and valence, as determined
by pretest, are indicated for the relevant items (4-13).
1 . To what extent do you think it will be difficult to work with this person?
2. How much are you looking forward to working with this person?
3. This person is friendly.
4. This person is independent in their behaviors and their opinions. [M+]
5. This person is nosy, indiscreet. [F-]
6. This person is as messy in their material lives as their relations. [M-]
7. This person is absent-minded in work and in everyday life. [M-]
8. This person is gossipy. [F-]
9. This person has a tendency to be a braggart. [M-]
10. This person is sentimental. [F+]
1 1 . This person is serious. [M+]
12. This person loves math. [M+]
13. This person is very family-oriented. [F+]
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APPENDIX C
STUDY 2: TRAIT INFORMATION
Anglo-American African-American
Positive articulate activist
take life seriously uninhibited
concerned with time strong heritage
executive qualities athletic
well-mannered communal
leader diverse
Negative egotistical use hands a lot
not rhythmic low economic clai
snob have an attitude
move stiffly bitter
not muscular undisciplined
uptight shoplift
Traits were selected for testing based on free-response trait generations in a prior
stage of testing. Participants listed as many positive and negative stereotypes as they could
for Anglo- and African-American stereotypes. Traits were subsequently tested in a
between-subjects design. Twenty-four Anglo-American students responded to 180 trait
questions, indicating how consistent each trait was with stereotypes of either Anglo- or
African-Americans. Participants responded to each trait using a scale of 1 (not at all) to 10
(very much). Final item selection was contingent on: 1) significant between group
differences, and 2) mean difference scores greater than or equal to 2 scale points, and
3) orthogonality (i.e., means fell on either side of the psychological scale mean of 5.5).
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APPENDIX D
STUDY 2: IMPRESSION RATING ITEMS
The following items constituted the pen-and-paper impression rating measure for
Study 2. Race-stereotypic items are identified below by race-consistency (White v. Black)
and valence (positive v. negative) in []’s after each item.
1.
) How competent is this person?
2.
) How unreliable is this person? [B-]
3
.) How unpredictable is this person? [B-]
4.
) How organized is this person? [W+]
5.
) How trustworthy is this person? [W+]
6.
) How bright is this person? [W+]
7.
) How friendly is this person?
8.
) How boring is this person?
9.
) How much are you looking forward to meeting this person?
Participants responded to each question by marking an “x” on a line immediately
below each item. The endpoints of the response lines were anchored by the phrases “Not
at all” and “Very.”
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APPENDIX E
STUDY 3: TRAIT INFORMATION
Female Male
Positive affectionate like math
neat like being single
Negative moody indelicate
panic easily showoff
Traits were selected for testing based on free-response trait generations in a prior
stage of testing. Participants listed as many positive and negative stereotypes as they could
for female and male stereotypes. Traits were subsequently tested in a between-subjects
design. Twenty-eight female students responded to 180 trait questions, indicating how
consistent each trait was with stereotypes of either women or men. Participants responded
to each trait using a scale of 1 (not at all) to 10 (very much). Final item selection was
contingent on: 1 ) significant between group differences, and 2) mean difference scores
greater than or equal to 2 scale points, and 3) orthogonality (i.e., means fell on either side
of the psychological scale mean of 5.5). A separate sample of twenty female students rated
each trait for positivity on a similar 1 0 point scale.
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APPENDIX F
STUDY 3: IMPRESSION RATING ITEMS
The following items constituted the pen-and-paper impression rating measure for
Study 2. Gender-stereotypic items are identified below by gender-consistency (Female v.
Male) and valence (positive v. negative) in []’s after each item.
1.
) How competent is this person?
2.
) How unfeeling is this person? [M-]
3.
) How gossipy is this person? [F-]
4.
) How bold is this person? [M+]
5.
) How sensitive to others is this person? [F+]
6.
) How likely is it this person minds his/her business? [M+]
7.
) How sentimental is this person? [F+]
8.
) How dull is this person?
9.
) How likely is it this person lacks gentleness? [M-]
10.
) How ambitious is this person?
11.
) How defenseless is this person? [F-]
12.
) How socially awkward is this person?
13.
) How collaborative is this person?
14.
) How much are you looking forward to/ did you enjoy meeting this person?
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APPENDIX G
STUDY 3: IMPRESSION MOTIVATION QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions
Please take a moment to think about what was important to you when you were reading the
profile(s) and information about other participants, now, with this in mind, please use the following
scale (1 to 10) to indicate how much each ofthe following statements reflects what was on your
mind at that time.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at All
on My Mind
7 8 9 10
Very Much
on My Mind
How Much
on Your
Mind?
I was trying to see ifmy expectations about the people were true.
I was trying to balance the good with the bad.
I was wondering what this person might think of me.
I was trying to gather as much information as possible.
I was thinking about what I could do to influence these people during the interaction.
I was trying to make a fair evaluation of each person.
I was very interested in learning about these people.
I was trying to match the information I had with a picture I had in my head ofthese people.
I was not very concerned about being rational.
I was trying to get through the information as quickly as possible so I could move
on to the next profile(s).
I was worried about the other people in my group having a positive impression ofme.
I was trying to leam novel information that might change my impressions.
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APPENDIX H
STUDY 4: ALTERNATE PERCEIVERS’ ATTENTION TO TRAIT INFORMATION
MEAN ATTENTION TO TRAIT INFORMATION
Perceiver / Target Power Roles
Alternate / Manager Alternate / Employee
Trait Trait
Valence Valence
Trait
Stereotype
Consistency Positive Negative
Stereotype 4.09 3.80
Consistent
Stereotype 4.19 4.61
Inconsistent
Positive Negative
3.70 3.76
4.06 4.82
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